



Journal of
**African Studies and
Development**

Volume 9 Number 5 June 2017

ISSN 2141 - 2189



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Review

Discontents in Japan's aid discourse in Africa: Land grabbing activism in Tokyo International Conference for Africa Development (TICAD) process

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Received 25 November, 2016; Accepted 8 May, 2017

Political resistance towards international development is a prevalent theme in global civil society and Non-Governmental organizations. The poor are often assumed to indubitably participate in resistance. However, the poor's participation is both diverse and complex. To understand this complexity, this paper attempts to explain the poor's acquiescence in incorporation into land grabbing deals. By examining Japan's discourse of development targeted to Africa, ambivalence of Tokyo International Conference for Africa Development (TICAD, 2015) rhetoric of ownership and partnership is described as disappropriately engaging the local populations in transfer of land from local populations to state, interstate apparatus, and transnational corporations for the purpose of large-scale investment in food crops. This has degraded the local environment and uprooted rural livelihoods. The mechanisms to facilitate and legitimise large-scale investment on food production have given shape to social relations, which are more conducive to the vision of a market society and threatened extinction of indigenous communities and impoverishment of rural communities. This expropriation of peasants land has encountered minimum opposition from the local population. This essay identifies "mutuality" as utilised within Japan's development discourse as depriving rural-landed-poor's of democratic space for land based contestation. Through an analysis of land grabbing activism in TICAD process, we highlight the limit of global civil society in articulating the context of poor communities.

Key words: Mutuality, resistance and contestation, land grabbing, and activism.

INTRODUCTION

Conceptual framework of mutuality and its discontents

Japan's development aid policy as outlined in Tokyo International Conference for Africa Development (TICAD) is perceived as distinctive and innovative. One of its key distinctive content is its intention to depart from the

conventional¹ model of official development aid. Through TICAD, Japan maintains that its own development experiences may offer better and effective solutions to Africa's development challenges (Jiro, 2013; Lehman, 2005).

Japan's development policy distinguishes itself by utilising dual principles of ownership and partnership. It is

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this appeal to mutual benefits discourse in TICAD that provides a benchmark for assessing Japan's cooperation with Africa. Through its over twenty years history, TICAD² has become crucial in designing Japan's development agenda in Africa. Discourses within TICAD have therefore emerged as important elements in endeavours to understand the impact as well as the nature of Japan's development agenda in Africa. TICAD discourse has been cited as harboring essential characteristics such as, Asian economic model, human resource development, and peace and security (Ampiah and Rose, 2012).

Through aspect of "mutuality" as engrained in TICAD process, Japan has specifically underscored necessity for self-help and national ownership (Ampiah, 2012). It is this urge that thrusts Japan into pursuance of principles of local ownership. Ownership as a concept implied to development is however overtly elusive. It is not only hard to define but also complicated by the sense that, "donors, lenders, and governments tend to adopt whatever definition that suits their agenda at any particular time, and in relation to particular issues at hand" (Ampiah and Rose, 2012). As (Ampiah, 2012) attests, the concept of ownership is further complicated by the fact that even with the perceived application of the concept, donating agents or governments still seek to control the design and the implementation of the donated funds or projects.

In development and international aid, discourses that emphasise partnership and ownership emerged towards the end of cold war. Moreover, most of its adherents are non-conventional development partners (TICAD, Forum on China-Africa Development (FOCAC), and India-Africa Forum Summit (IFAS). Japan has specifically implied mutuality widely since 1990s. Japan's interest in Africa has taken new trajectories from the cold war policies that largely sought to align with the Washington consensus (Ampiah and Rose, 2012). Through TICAD process, Japan has capitalized on discourses around partnership and ownership. These notions have set a foundation for emergence of "mutuality"³ as emphasised during TICAD V (MOFA, 2013). The drafting of aid policy hinged on mutuality has over the history of TICAD informed the process and engenders a major departure from particulars and pressures of "western aid" forced upon Africans. Paradigms of development project driven by Japan in TICAD discourse that capitalises on "mutuality" is seen as dynamic, integrating, and accounting of Africa's most pressing challenges.

Ampiah and Rose (2012) assessment of ownership highlights problems in Japanese policy-makers tendency to conflate it with the aspects of self-help⁴. TICAD's "mutuality" is often depicted to be practised through engagement with private sector led growth, inclusion of African Union (AU) commission as TICAD co-organiser, and promotion of South-South and Triangular co-operation that enhances transfer of Asian experience

(Yokohama declaration, MOFA, 2013).

On the other hand, interpretation of ownership within TICAD process has been seen to mean Africans taking closer steps towards responding to or assimilating policies as outlined by TICAD process. Hence ownership is seen as efforts such as those within formation of the New Partnership for Africa Development (NEPAD). NEPAD, as a proposal by South Africa, Nigeria, and Senegal does of course resonate with voices calling for inclusion of African views in policy making within TICAD. Ownership in this case is attained if decisions regarding policies that are prioritized for funding are proposed and forwarded by the African governments and policy makers.

In this respect, "mutuality" as emerging within TICAD precedes from concepts of self-help (Ampiah, 2012) and ownership (Ampiah and Lehman, 2005). Both of these concepts, especially self-help are founded on the preferences given to state-led development. "Mutuality" in this sense has meant engaging in the state led formulation for development policies and strategies. "Mutuality" as it emerges right from the conception of TICAD process reflects within it ideas that seem to solely encourage ownership as led by the state. It therefore seems appropriate to assert that TICAD "mutuality" emphasises the role of the state. Lehman (2005) notes that:

"the Japanese government believes that the state administrative functions have crucial role in development process. In protocolar, the state can facilitate necessary economic production, as has been the case of Japan and other Asian countries".

An emphasis on "mutuality" has increased economic investments as more efforts have been put to promote dialogue between Official Development Assistance (ODA) and private sector. Some have however viewed this relationship as reinforcing asymmetric relations citing resource-focused strategies that have only led to new forms of exploitation in Africa. Despite good intentions of mutual concepts that emphasise ownership, it has failed to conceptualise key revolutionary pillars of development. It has rather remained simplified and lacking of mechanisms that analyse the context of the poor who are the target of development schemes. TICAD's ownership as defined based on dialogue between governments, private sector, and civil society (Lehman, 2005) has failed to identify if state-led ownership has represented the interests of the poor by entrusting their aspirations to governments and elites policy makers.

IS MUTUALITY REBALANCING THE EQUATION?

Foreign capital flowing to targets of development in the

South is often exercised on foundations of discourses of neocolonialism that emphasises power imbalances where domestic political and economic conditions are externally controlled (Tiger and Nkrumah, 1966). This way of understanding foreign capital categorises it not as used for development but for exploitation of less developed areas. Mutuality in development discourse has arisen as a means to curb perceptions against notions of exploitation. While mutuality purports inclusion, its tripartite (state, private sector, and civil society) engagement puts into question if the concept accurately articulates the context of the poor. By implying “mutuality” interests of sponsoring governments are given dignified recognition. In this respect, Japan, through TICAD process has been associated with engrossment of resources through a development that is resource focused (Ampiah and Rose, 2012) whose implementation is through economic based investment. Economic investment as driven by Japan’s ODA via strange engagement with private sector in TICAD has focused in analysing and countering Japan-China-Africa resource based perspectives.

The theoretical appeal of development model capitalising on “mutuality” harbours important potential insights in understanding aid regime. Those who have attempted investigation on Japan’s utilisation of “mutuality” have leaned towards analysing binary between Japan as aid provider and African policy makers as receivers on the one hand (Ampiah 2012). There has also been an increased acceptance of civil society as proprietors of authentic voices of the poor. In this light, it has become necessary to reimagine the nature of civil society particularly in Africa as bearers of interests of the poor. The civil society has been criticised as lacking legitimacy to represent a constituency (Srinivas, 2012)⁵. Lack of legitimacy to stand for constituency notwithstanding, civil society in Africa has been preoccupied with proselytising specific elite agenda. Hence, it must be viewed in Chatterjee’s (2004)⁶ terms “as an elite construct.”

If aspirations of civil society do not necessarily reflect those ascertained by the poor, then it is necessary to account for what we can term as authentic voices of the poor in response to international donor policies. It seems plausible that civil society represents authentic voices of the poor. However, Africa’s own percipience and engagement with TICAD particularly as a field for activism has received minimal attention both in academia and media. The silences against Japan’s development discourse has been seen as reifying the prominence of Japan development policy and acceptability of notions that Africa is leaning in favour of East led development. Analysis of protest against Japan led aid are further complicated by the poor’s acquiescence. Acquiescence is often taken to implore that the poor benefit from “mutuality”. The poor’s action in response to “mutuality” bears important indicators towards understanding the

role of “mutuality” in cajoling local populations into acceptance of Japan’s funded development deals.

Acceptance of “mutuality” based policies although not leading to inclusion into global capital flows as conjured by the poor has created new spaces to claim inclusion. While “mutuality” seems to take advantage of good will from the developing countries, it has at the same time obliterated the attitudes and responses of the poor since it falls short in articulating the context of the poor and account of their acquiescence. This has not only eased the vision of poor as frontiers of exercise of power, but also exacerbated development projects targeted to the poor. Such projects have burgeoned on the premise of what Tania Murray Li identifies as a necessity to improve (Li, 2007), which the poor ardently partake in. A necessity to improve characterises of the local farmers as low yielding, with poor skills, and ignorant on the one hand while on the other allowing practices that enable experts to diagnose the problems and devise interventions. This is done through wittingly or unwittingly producing social relations that accommodate capital market usually at the expense of local livelihoods. Ramifications of shattered livelihoods are often extinction of indigenous, impoverished communities, displacement (forced), intensified agricultural production, and social upheaval (Li, 2007).

CONFRONTING MUTUALITY IN TICAD PROCESS

Development projects assume diverse dispositions at their target locations. It is plausible to be concerned with how the poor have interpreted Japan’s “mutuality” ascertaining it as a bridge to global capital flows. Discontent, opposition, and revolt are one key area that underscores the nature of Japan’s mutuality with the poor. Since contestation is articulated in activism, activism is construed as representing the most authentic voices of the poor.

Activism within TICAD process has in most cases hinged on land grabbing. Triangular Cooperation for Agricultural Development of the Tropical Savannah in Mozambique (ProSAVANNA-JBM), a tripartite initiative of the Japanese, Brazilian, and Mozambique governments has attracted pressure towards Japanese development policy in Africa. Increased pressure has been mounting from both local activists in Mozambique and Japan. The peak for civil society led opposition resulted to National Peasants Union (UNAC) from Mozambique significant protest during TICAD V in 2013 at Yokohama. Exploration of ProSavanna Project as a model of contradicting theatrics in TICAD’s own claim of stipulating “Mutual” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2013 a, b)⁷ benefits with Africa underscores the argument against TICAD’s own claim but also puts to question representation of local contexts by the civil society.

To understand voices of discontent that have been founded on land grabbing, most of which revolve around cases from Mozambique, there is need to grasp major issues on land grabbing. Literature addressing land grabbing has capitalized on dispossession and displacement. Often, criticism is leveled against investors for dispossessing subsistent farmers. Those in economic development thought believe this surge of interest in African land is an opportunity for Africa. The state in Africa has shown strong delineation toward this view. Other non-state actors such as World Bank have also given preference to systems that support good conditions for investments. Japan's activities through Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) strongly show similar preference. The state in Africa has acted to create conducive environment for investments. Mozambican government, which owns the land in Mozambique, has been encouraging foreign investment on land.

Civil society and many developments focused non governmental organisations (NGOs) as well as advocacy organisations have sounded an alarm to land related activities in Africa. Such critical reports can be found in GRAIN⁸, Oxfam, and the Oakland Institute. Advocacy based on non-kept promises of compensation have attained a very high profile stature in international development discourse. However, despite awareness of uprooted livelihoods, the poor are absurdly engaged in global capital flows. This process has occurred through their own pursuit of inclusion and participation in global markets. On the one hand through engagement with development discourses that promise "mutuality". This particular nature of responses by the poor does call for further investigations and research, but it also allows the claim that pursuit of inclusion by the poor is crucial to contestation against large-scale land investment.

Peasant studies that aim to analyse resistance to land deals have emphasised peasant agency, reactions to dispossession, and incorporation into global capital. Such studies rightly indict that land deals resistance from a local level are both disparate and diverse (Borras, Hall, Scoones, White, & Wolford, 2011).

This study introduces peasantry's (hereby referred to as rural-landed-poor⁹) reactions towards development discourse, which we claim appears to them as bearing unwavering promise of inclusion in global capital flows. The tripartite coalition (Japan, Brazil, and Mozambique) steering Pro-Savanna project besides lacking mechanisms of accountability, has lured indigenous communities in Mozambique into project fetishisation through engaging in "mutual" rhetoric as spearheaded by Japan's aid discourse. The shaping of social relations that reflects the glory of markets harbors the sole responsibility of disenfranchising the local populations. The locals are however myopic to the acts of their own expropriation. This is bed-locked in the rationale within "mutuality" and its promise thereof.

An investigation of the meaning of "mutuality" as pursued, applied, and practised by the local communities, and discrepancies with its intended meaning by the development partners, opens us to the possibilities of the quest and yield (by the poor) to the self-destructing machine. It is the poor's understanding of "mutuality" that encourages them to strip themselves off their protection (possession, in this case land) as a form of taking entrepreneurial risks. Entrepreneurial risks bear the promise of reward, and therefore render it difficult for the rural-landed-poor to divorce from it. This understanding also limits rational engagement with the potential negative consequences such as dispossession, decreased or diminishing of local means of food production, and environmental degradation as occurring as a result of change in land relations.

GLOBAL LAND GRABBING DEALS IN LOCAL CONTEXT

The land grabbing phenomena of 2007 and 2008 is documented in various reports as involving government to government and private sector acquisition of large portions of land for agri-business purposes. These deals are usually on large-scale bases ranging from 10,000 hectares and beyond. The land is used for rice, wheat, corn, and soybeans production for export purposes. The period that recorded highest cases of land grabbing took place at the backdrop of high food prices around the globe and a global financial crisis. The riots that followed high prices on food were witnessed in many countries confirming the loss in capacity for many developed countries to feed their populations.

The inability of the countries to feed their people precipitated a search for new strategies from non-conventional producers of food. The key synthesis was acquisition of agricultural land in areas perceived to be underutilized for the purpose of mitigating the shortage of food. Such large-scale acquisition of land targeting both cultivated and uncultivated land in developing countries has been on the rise since 2008 (Deininger and Byerlee, 2011; Grain.org, 2016; Borras et al., 2011).

GRAIN estimates that 3,000 million hectares was acquired by around only five hundred deals in the period that lasted for only eight years. These land deals were highly concentrated in the South in which Africa was the focal target. Ethiopia sold around 4,000,000 hectares (Baumgartner et al., 2015). Mozambique has also featured prominently in the media reports and academic research. It is among countries with abundant land, hence vulnerable to land based frontiers. Land availability is also attributed to comparatively cheaper market land rates, a factor that has attracted varied interests from both developed and developing states (Mousseau and Mittal, 2011). On the other hand, the undervalued land and land lease policy that allows long-

term agreement has had Mozambique become a favourable destination of those interested in land deals (Mousseau and Mittal, 2011).

The approaches taken by various governments in the North are diverse. The government of Japan sought to support its own private sector that deals with food production. The increased demand of vegetable oil and other food items led to state investment in food industries in corporations such as Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sojitz, Toyota Tsusho, Sumitomo, and Marubeni. Marubeni only handles 10 million tonnes of annual soybean import. The state supported these corporations through infrastructure development to facilitate export. The ProSavanna project in Mozambique promoted a focus known as “made with Japan”. Therefore, Japan’s participation in Mozambique was built on the foundation of successes in similar Brazilian land investment as noted by Batista (Clements and Fernandes, 2013) while its role remained rather derivative. Japan supported Brazil in efforts to replicate a model of agrarian investment in Mozambique (Clements and Fernandes, 2013) through aiding and implementation of ProSavanna Project. This project is hinged upon an appeal to “mutual” benefits as offered by development partners.

Mozambique’s vulnerability to non-conventional development partners thrives on both colonial aspect and failed neoliberal policies. The new development partners seem not to be involved in “under-developing Africa” (Rodney et al., 1981). However, this has not obliterated the possibilities of exploitation and exclusionary practices since, “they find resonance with colonial-like aspects inherent in the present wave of foreign land acquisitions taking place across the globe, and with particular emphasis in Africa” (Clements and Fernandes, 2013). Non-Western development partners’ language of “mutuality” must be interpreted as re-fashioning North-South binary, mostly aimed at gaining competitive niche, but not entirely presenting a new model for African development as Borras and Franco note, “the phenomenon of global land grabbing is underpinned by an explicitly expansionist capitalist logic and driven by neoliberal doctrine” (Borras and Franco, 2011).

Within Japan’s development discourse that underscores “mutuality”, Japan proclaims herself as disparate and preferably distinct when compared to North-South development model. Japan-Brazil alliance in ProSavanna Project however reveals inconsistencies in this rhetoric. “Mutuality” may allude to job creation, poverty alleviation, steady food supply, and realisation of “modernisation” for the recipient societies. For development partners, however, it implies expansion of its capitalistic empire. The concept of “Mutuality” deprives recipient communities of the power to seek redress from development partners. This happens while the local communities are left to deal with appalling consequences of development projects. Although Africa has in the recent past exhibited fatigue

with the Western development model, uncoordinated absorption of non-Western models of development subjects societies to the very risk and pitfalls of the past. Perceived benefits of “mutuality” although gaining popularity in development discourse seems to fail to account for their shortcomings. As Global Voices (2011) has asserted, in the case of Mozambique’s ProSavanna Project it is a replication of Brazil’s Cerrado biome whose negative consequences have conspicuously not been addressed. The practice of development implemented through the appeals to mutuality has come face to face with land grabbing deals. Borras et al (2011) has observed that,

“The image of global land grabbing is being appropriated by those who are bent on re-casting the phenomena itself as a golden opportunity to further extend capitalist agro-industry in the name of pro-poor and ecologically sustainable economic development. This extremely dubious agenda is now being consolidated around the dangerously seductive call for code of conduct to discipline big land deals and transform them into supposedly more ethical win-win outcomes.”

The argument penned on the reason for land grabbing is “agri-business.” Agri-business in Africa has gained traction with the governments who are occupied with inviting the youth to go back to rural areas and farm (Bafana, 2014; Lyocks et al., 2014). There is a mismatch between the state conception of agri-business and local rural people conception of agriculture. The logic for agricultural investment is that there is a saturated market in the North and the growing middle class in the vast growing urban centers in Africa. The saturated markets in the North have driven entrepreneurs to solicit for new markets in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. These entrepreneurs often have to bear the consequences of confronting the local rural populations who either have been committed to cultivate their land or are frustrated by traditional farming methods whose yield is insufficient to sustain their livelihood.

Another view of land grabbing deals as driven by foreign investment in Africa has focused on production of biofuels, hence analysing the negative impact to communities living in the affected areas (Andrew and Van Vlaenderen, 2015). Such analysis of land acquisition, sale, or long term leasing by foreign investors have laid emphasis on the gap between transnational corporations Trans-National Corporations (TNC) eagerness to land acquisition and small holders farmers resistance (Cotula and Vermeulen, 2009; Colin and Woodhouse, 2010). This gap has been expounded in terms of its impact on local residents livelihoods, the local’s accessibility to land (theory of access (Ribot and Peluso, 2003), and food security (Hall, 2013)).

Other discussions connect political dynamics of land policy and its perception at grassroots level as found

intertwined in transnational large scale deals in agrarian capitalism (Franco and Borras, 2012), global land grabbing deals as seen by activists, movements for environment change (Fairhead et al., 2012), and agrarian justice as basically opposed to transnational land transactions as they view them as primarily dispossessing and disappropriating peasant societies (Franco and Borras, 2012; Grain.org, 2016).

The confrontation with the rural population is emphasized by a thesis that focuses on dislocation as a result of commercialization. The argument in this perspective is that entrepreneurs from developed countries undermine local food production systems. This thesis cites the increase in sale of food in supermarkets and convenient stores, which makes local rural populations to be enticed in commercialized food systems (GRAIN, 2016).

The argument further sees a global encroachment of industrial crops such as palm oil, soybeans, and sunflower oil. This encroachment replaces local mechanisms of food production and markets. Thesis on dislocation makes it significant to emphasize on nature of responses by small-scale farmers in Africa and their encounter with the global land grabbing.

Over 80% of land in Africa is small scale owned. The small-scale farmers account for the highest production of food in the world. In Africa, there have been courageous confrontations by communities that are opposed to land grabbing. Alliances have been formed within local communities international civil society, and NGOs to attempt an articulation of the challenges resulting from trans-national investment on land. Those opposed to large-scale food production have an important case. The main opposition to large-scale production in Africa is that it replaces local means of food production with non-sustainable agri-business, which is a threat to livelihoods of local populations.

Besides the argument against usurping local methods of food production and dislocation, the alliance between local populations and global civil society fails to highlight the salient support for investors by the local populations. I argue that whereas trans-national investment on land does not seem to be carried out as a result of a thorough understanding of rural livelihoods, attempts to articulate rural livelihoods by the global civil society is myopic and one sided. The latter relies on generalizations of concepts of local ownership of land and local means of food production.

Therefore, this study looks into the nature of events surrounding land-grabbing deals in the South that discusses responses of both organized and everyday forms of resistance to demand inclusion and encounter threats of dispossession. We draw attention to complexity of political reactions from below to emphasize on the necessity to critically evaluate the trans-national alliances with the elite local representatives in order to show that the context of local populations is usually

eclipsed in those who possess knowledge of methods in global civil society.

To protect local farmers from the self-destructing machine dispossession resulting from TNCs land deals, rights to land (property), and mechanisms of exchange have been emphasised. It is often claimed that with proper legislation and policy in place, risks can be curbed. Hence, International Food Policy Research Institute report (IFPRI, 2009) and the World Bank have given focus to policy, rights to property, and mechanisms of exchange. Such thesis claims that proper legislation and policy has the ability to shield local farmers from the negative impacts of global land deals. Local realities however contradict this claim.

In the instances where efforts have been made to safeguard the rights of locals through legislation, the challenges of low yields and low profitability from land have prompted them to seek for alternatives. Such alternatives are sought out through making use of state's guaranteed property rights. Protection through titling therefore becomes means of providing accessibility to capital using land property rights. The promise of "mutuality" in land deals brings into reality the fact that deriving benefits from the land is within reach by the local farmers. The local farmers have therefore tended to dissent from viewing land in terms of property rights. On the contrary, they have emphasised on ability to derive benefits from land. This view is close to theory of access, (Ribot and Peluso, 2003) which differentiates access from property. Access is discussed as an ability to derive benefits from things dissenting from view of property as right to benefit from things.

Furthermore, vulnerability of local farmers to the promise of "mutuality" confirms insufficiency of safeguarding property rights as a way of protecting the poor. In this line of thought, clear and secure land property rights although necessary are insufficient to guarantee protection of the rural poor (Cotula et al., 2011).

Similarly, Franco and Borras (2011) points out that secure rights should not be a priori, only or always, means to private property rights.

CHALLENGES TO PURSUANCE OF MUTUALITY: THE CHANGING TRAJECTORIES IN LAND USE

States in alliance with transnational actors predisposes communities into projects and plans that ostensibly promise advancement of target communities. On their part, peasantry is confronted with stringent challenges on land use. Land owned by the peasants has depreciated in value over time, undergone poor market prices, and recorded low food production.

This scenario has made it easy for those who depict the peasant's land as unproductive and under-utilised. In this case, it is not wholesomely falsification for the

transnational actors and states to depict land as low yielding to pave way for the investments.

It is under the premise that the harsh farming conditions have undeniably yielded lesser over the years that conjure the peasants into the quest to “catch up” and not be left behind in global inclusion. Peasantry amenability to better means of farming aided by new technologies, which is the main component promised by the transnational actors, has largely facilitated their acceptance as “saviours.” Such an inclination does not by any means justify land grabbing. It does however explicate rationality behind ingression of “saviours.”

Dwindling value of land

“Saviours” ingression has burgeoned on the account of rural-landed-poor’s vulnerability mainly as crystallising within changes in land use. While the TNCs respond to global food crisis through a search for land for agrarian investment (Borras and Franco, 2011, Plaas.org.za, 2015), peasantries give up their land as a response to social conditions shaped by incursion by global investors.

Reinterpretation of land use at a local level has also been necessitated by an experience of food shortage in Mozambique occurring due to routine draughts, poor food production as a result of over cultivation, and farmers’ lack of markets for the little surplus they managed out of the land (IRINnews, 2015; Almeida et al., 2015).

Whereas, the pro-poor activists emphasize on the poor’s attachment to land, hence their inclination towards antagonism to land deals, their thesis falls sort to articulate the poor’s context in key areas: one, that the rural farmers increasingly encounter frustrations in maintaining traditional methods of food production, and two, that the dwindling value of land in terms of agricultural utility and economic value. According to Africa Development Bank (ADB), average annual economic growth dropped to 6.3% in 2015 from the previous 7% rate (Andre et al, 2016). The high levels of poverty often results to government dependency on development aid to mitigate effects of poverty. According to a 2012 development report, Mozambique ranked 185th out of 189 countries (“UNDP Annual Report 2011-2112”, 2012). Poverty levels are estimated to be highest in rural Mozambique, which is about 70% of the population. A common character of rural population is their dependency on subsistence agriculture.

The rural agriculture is characterized by low productivity and high vulnerability to climatic shocks. A high percentage of farmers in rural Mozambique rely on rain-fed agriculture. The over-reliance on natural climate makes rural population vulnerable to both draughts and flooding phenomena. Although draught periods form a highly predictable pattern (for instance East African

region experienced draughts in range of four years from 1982 to 1992 (Mwangi et al., 2013; "Drought in East Africa: Natural Hazards", 2017) the State still projects high levels of unpreparedness in putting ways of mitigating effects of draughts. Recorded famine and draughts in Mozambique are 1982 to 1984 and 1991 to 1992, which affected 3 million people, and 2001 to 2002.

In 2014, the minister for agriculture in Mozambique released a warning of effects of famine, which would affect more than 300,000 people ("Mozambique: Drought And Floods", 2010) The vicious effects that cause flooding and draught are not unique to Mozambique. They are caused by the effects of warming waters of the Pacific Ocean often referred to as El-Nino effects. Recently, food shortage due to climate related causes have continued to be reported.

In 2014, United Nations Development Program (UNDP) reported that 300,000 people were at a risk of facing severe famine. Overall, FAO estimates that 48% of Mozambique population is prone to flooding and famine risks (FAO 2007). The Deutsche Welle, citing government sources, reported in 2016 that 115,700 people were affected by hunger. In a written question in the UK parliament ("Mozambique: Droughts and Famine: Written question - 55360", 2017), the question to secretary of state for international development was asked if she would make additional assistance to Mozambique for famine relief. The response was that the UK government would fulfill the pledge to lead global humanitarian response to leverage the situation by providing 170 million Pounds to Zimbabwe, Malawi, Lesotho, Madagascar, and Mozambique.

The inability of the state to handle effects of draught has been a challenge to Mozambicans both for climatic and historical reasons. The aggression of rebels was among many of the factors that worsened 1982 to 1984 draught, which had affected around 4 million people (Henry, 1984). The anti-government war that persisted then forced rural villagers to vacate their land, which highly disrupted rural agriculture. The estimated number of villagers displaced by rebels was around 1 to 2 million according to a New York Times report of 1986. This population failed to produce food for both national economy and themselves. This indicates complicated loci to Mozambique’s dependency on aid since crop production has been diminishing over the years.

According to National Statistics Institute (INE), the mainstay of Mozambican economy is rain-fed agriculture. The main rain-fed agricultural activities which stands at 95% account for subsistence farming (USAID, 2017). Subsistence farming is overwhelmingly characterized by traditional methods of cultivation in production of crops such as cassava, groundnuts, maize, beans, and sweet potatoes. The recent few years have witnessed a shift on focus from such rain-fed agriculture that produces food crops to a more technologically dependent cash crop farming. This shift has witnessed an increase in

both private and state ventures into production of export crops. This has in part been through efforts to make use of under-utilized portions of land. Farmers who have encountered frustrations in crop production due to famines and draughts as well as flooding have also come face to face with poor productivity of subsistence crops. Adapting to cash crops production through openness to export ventures has been one of the appropriate avenues that they have implied to redeem themselves out of poverty.

Furthermore, preference of cash crops has occurred because of effects on food prices on the poor. The end effects have been a limit to production of traditional crop varieties. This has also affected the prices of land, making the offers from investors attractive. According to census of Agriculture in 2010, the Ministry of Agriculture estimated production of cassava as ranging between 4,000 to 7,000 metric tonnes in the years 2005 to 2007. Cynthia and Emilio (2010) cite the issues surrounding marketability of cassava. In the year 2009 and 2010, they observed that production of cassava was 7,437 compared to 1,932 of maize. From this production, maize exported 12% while cassava export was less than 1% showing that the over produced and cassava lacks market both domestically and abroad. Besides the threat of famine and flooding, the farmers also are constrained by diseases such as streak and mosaic diseases. The farmers also face market security related issues as discussed by Cynthia and Emilio (2010).

Land laws and rights discourse

During the interview, Clemente Nyimpine, in response to the question about how valuable titling is to him stated that,

“we have heard some people tell us that titles are important to protect our rights to land. I am not denying that this paper (title deed) is important, but I think it is useless if this land does not help me feed and educate my children.”

Subsequent conditions surrounding land use, the manner in which interpretation and implementation of land laws takes shape as driven by peasants' aspirations, is also pivotal in disentangling their embrace for TNCs land deals.

Franco (2008) has shown that land laws and policies are not self-interpreting; conflicts arise in the process of interacting with diversified actors in the state and the society. The peasantry own understanding of land related policies opens various ways of understanding underlying social relations as expressed through or related to land. Such attitudes holds potential to shape social, economic, political and cultural discourses. Interpretation of land policy by the peasants opens possibility to explain their

“reticent” or “receptivity” to global interventions. The process of interpreting and understanding of land policy by peasantry also opens us to social relations that point beyond states simplification (Scott, 1998).

Particularly important is that discourses of the peasants do not only show opposition towards state simplification, but they prove a desirous for inclusion in state-driven initiatives. The farmers in Mozambique have not shown opposition to the process of titling. Instead, titling strengthened the promise of possibility of integration into global flows of capital perceived to have ability to trickle down. Peasants are not disinterested in titling, on the contrary, they believe in the magical power that the title holds; for collateral that assures them of economic stability.

At the local level those conditions attached to land devaluation have catalyzed villagers allegiance to large-scale agrarian projects. The process of facilitating investments is done through search for legal protection or concession to rights of land. The level of interest in delimitation and registration of land rights is not only because the locals sought legal protection. Primacy is given to delimitation and search to register land rights so as to strategically position themselves as beneficiaries of foreign direct investments emerging from both a perceived availability and unproductivity of land.

According to Millennium Challenge Corporation, that mapped 45,018 urban land parcels since 2011 in Mozambique, titling recorded up to 19,356 land parcels. In municipalities of Cuamba, Lichiga, Mocimboa da Praia, Mocuba, Monapo, Nampula, Pemba, and Quelimane had issued 12,634 title deeds.¹⁰ This is almost the same year that interests in investments were popularized among the local population. This was at the backdrop of the awareness championed by the NGOs and donor organizations. Land based activism did not necessarily lead to securing protection rights for the sole purposes of protection from land grabbing as most activists seem to purport. On the contrary, it led to exposure of availability of opportunity to access better living conditions.

The perceived leniency by the peasantry towards titling casts doubts to discourses of dispossession spearheaded by civil society. Based on the civil society advocacy agenda, ProSavana triggers potential dispossession and displacement (Clements and Fernandes, 2013; Mapote, 2015; Globalpolicy.org, 2015; Baxter, 2015, despite its promise to lift the living standards of the poor in rural Mozambique. An engagement in the discourses as produced by the Mozambican peasantry articulate their own perception of disappropriation, dispossession, and displacement not as a primary concern. Scrutinised through the eyes of local populations, titling is accorded a general acceptance as it was seen as securing means for peasants to engage with the market, hence acquire income to self-sustain.

Furthermore, “displacement” so long as it provided new land or some amount of compensation was widely accepted. Although these claims were used by the civil society in speaking out against the state and transnational actors on behalf of the peasants, their views diverged from the vision of the rural-landed-poor. This calls for need to investigate the changing nature of the civil society in Africa as it has tended to represent a particular elite construct to gain acceptance with global civil society. Although from within the writings of global land grabbing there is a general concession that dispossession is among the key issue for peasantry, who are always analysed as being acted upon in dispossession, the peasants have largely viewed an alliance with the “land grabbers” as an opportunity to access a portion of global capital and gain means to escaping radical poverty.

The limits of titling to shield to peasants from land investments complicates the discourse on land grabbing. This as well shows limits to debates on rights to land. Borras (2012) has called upon what he refers to as “realignment of political forces at the international, national, and local levels, mobilised within human rights framework” noting that, Code of Conduct (CoC)’s “response to the global land grab veers away from questioning the fundamental roots of land-grabbing, that is, the existing industrial pattern of food and energy production and consumption controlled by TNCs, while engaging in the problematic notion of win-win scenario.”

However, Borras (2012) proposal of land sovereignty based on human rights is at times downplayed by the poor whose pursuit is not just rights, but inclusion into global flows through coveting for mutual benefit. The human rights based approach largely perceived as a possible solution to poverty, has pushed and attracted legislation agenda. Large-scale investors as long as they act within the confines of such legislations are not seen as necessarily hurting the poor. Within category of legislation, calls for “Code of Conduct” to ensure “win-win” outcomes (Von et al, 2009) have been proposed. Further, there has also arisen notions like “principles of Responsible Agricultural Investment (RAI) which is an initiative of the World Bank (Deininger, 2011). Beyond such calls that are basically formulated under the inspiration of TNCs impact in rural communities, the language of win-win (“mutuality”) has appeared as a strategy aimed towards securing a niche for development partners.

As discussed earlier, Borras (2012) has shown there are complex and dynamic changes in land use. This change is not in one direction, that is, in favour of food and biofuels production for export. In Borras (2012) classification, change in land use has three categories; A1, A2, and A3. A1 consists actors whose pursuit of land is defined in terms of commoditization and food production. A2 is the category that encompasses transformation of means of production, moving from

production for domestic purposes to production of food for export markets. A3 can be said to be the category reversing A2 through transforming land that used to be for export to domestic production. Those countries that belong to A2 have a distinctive character. They are considered “non-traditional” on issues not only of land grabbing but history of colonization of the South. In this categorisation, Borras has indicated Japan, alongside Korea, India, and China as belonging to category A2 (Borras and Franco, 2011)¹¹.

The “non-traditional” character has given such countries like Japan a leeway to engage the South without meaningful opposition. The political and economic powers available and accessible to the rural-landed-poor to enable them engage with such global capital flows is the fact that they own portions of land (customarily or otherwise at least through a loose definition of ownership as evidenced via titling). The poor make up majority of those who owns portions of land. Mozambique’s majority poor living in the rural areas are 70% according to national household survey (Rural Poverty Portal, 2015).

Levels of poverty notwithstanding they legally hold possession to land as property despite limited access to it. The inaccessibility of land has therefore resulted into an upsurge in the aspiration to be indulged into global agrarian capital flows. In this respect, the poor’s perception of participation and struggles with TNCs should be accounted for in changes in land use (Borras, 2012).

Furthermore, the dwindling status of land activities has increased peasants’ vulnerability as discussed earlier. Despite civil activism emphasis around the disappropriation of rural-landed-poor traditional means of crop farming (Monjane, 2015; Unac.org.mz, 2015), peasantry agriculture has been plummeting. Dependence on traditional crops has subsequently led to inability to support the population need for food. As stated earlier, traditionally produced crops have had minimal chances of actively competing in the global market. The disease outbreak, famine (IFAD, 2009), and lack of state investment in means that can sustain traditional methods of crop and livestock production has left the land owners with no alternative but to seek means of joining the already saturated global market.¹²

Land ownership is therefore an important bridge of the poor to profits and economic inclusion. Having property (land) that produces below expectations has denied rural-landed-poor the much-needed access to their rightfully owned property. The poor have often turned to utilisation of bundles of right (IFAD, 2009) that enables them to reach out to transnational actors often depicted as bringing in mutual benefits. Having despised traditional means of production, the rural-landed-poor look up to legal documents as bridges into glory of global capital. The titling process underscores state’s priority in transformation of land policy in Mozambique. Since

inauguration of land policies in Mozambique (1997) the government has initiated practices that have allowed Mozambicans to exercise rights over land and natural resources. This possession with titling and rights however shields the main concern of the rural-landed-poor, which has turned from land occupancy to land utility and profitability. The key concern has therefore not been possessing land but vehemently being unable to draw livelihood thereof. Forces that render land unproductive have co-relations with factors that encourage the urge for inclusivity among rural-landed-poor.

What then could be said of the reasons why the rural-landed-poor portrayed ambivalence towards Japan/Brazil led project, ProSavanna? And how should silences, or semi structured oppositions be interpreted? Although dominant discourses within Mozambique's ProSavanna based activism focus on dispossession (Unac.org.mz, 2015) empirical evidence does not support the dispossession thesis.

In this project, the most common consequences have been displacement and dislocation rather than dispossession. The process of displacement and dislocation, viewed from the rural-landed-poor's perspective, however, is not overtly destructive but an opportunity to make better their livelihood through easing access to capital. Rural-landed-poor have viewed re-routing, re-drawing and re-fixing of boundaries and changes in agrarian structure as a positive attempt. This does not by any mean imply that the rural-poor do not struggle with dispossession.

Contrary to assertions of conventional activism, acquiescence (Scott, 1998) towards displacement and dislocation is rural-landed-poor's means of fulfilling a search for inclusivity. Whereas rural-landed-poor have voiced concerns with TNCs, they have not entirely shown formidable opposition against development incursion. The notions of mutuality implied by policy makers have deprived the rural-landed-poor of their democratic space to challenge and organise opposition towards investors. Mutuality, as outlined within TICAD process disfigures, undemarcates friend/enemy border and in its place presumes homogeneity of locus and investments intentions.

The other reason for openness to TNCs and development initiatives is ambiguity of "mutuality" as seen within analysis of sustainability of ProSavanna project. The outcome of initial project in Brazil when taken to account has shown that sufficient measures to address the challenges raised by locals in Brazil were not examined before the proposal and implementation of the sister project in Mozambique (Ajf.gr.jp, 2015).

The acceptance of the project in Mozambique was therefore void of historical analysis of its effects and results in Brazil. The blinded wholesale acceptance of the project was anchored upon the focus on success story and its reference to "mutuality" as a concept in the

implementation. Although local communities are often presented as knowledgeable with ability to negotiate access to and control over resources and capable of its own protection (Nooteboom and Edwin, 2010) the assumptions that the locals are able to rightly articulate their needs does not always mean that they oppose incursion.

Nooteboom and Edwin continues to argue that the success of local communities tends to be over-valued. In local resource management, the rural-landed-poor can be perceived in two ways; ignorant, polluting, destructive, and explosive or secondly, as knowledgeable, and able to access and control resources. While giving credit to rural knowledge about their own communities, it is also crucial to emphasise on what allures the rural-landed-poor into acceptance of the projects through appeals of "mutuality."

CONTESTATION OF TICAD'S MUTUALITY IN RURAL MOZAMBIQUE¹³

Dissenting voices against ProSavanna in both Mozambique and Japan are organized within leading voices in civil society. The grievances raised by these groups carry an authentic message that requires a response and action from JICA and Mozambican government officials. TICAD V forum in 2013, attracted the most diversified participation from civil society and advocacy groups. These groups consists of a merger between both Africans and Japanese rights based organisations. TICAD V student project is one of such groups that championed for youth agenda in the TICAD process (TICAD V 学生プロジェクト, 2015). Another group was Africa Japan Forum (AJF) (Ajf.gr.jp, 2015).

AJF represented a more inclusive and authoritative program that coordinated both Japan and African civil society. AJF used Mozambican case specifically to highlight discontents arising from local level on Japanese aid regime intervention. Open letters by Mozambique, Japan, and Brazil civil society (Africafocus.org, 2015) challenged ProSavanna program in Nicala corridor citing that:

- (1) There was lack of consultation,
- (2) There was insufficient environmental impact assessment,
- (3) There was possible damage to farmers, and
- (4) The major beneficiary were noted to be likely be multinational corporations and the private sector with absence of public participation.

The civil society rights movement made strong assertions that the process overlooked constitutional requirement that demands public participation and conduct of environmental impact assessment. They asserted that, "ProSavanna programme is already being implemented through its quick projects component,

without the environmental impact assessment study ever having been carried out, publicly discussed and approved...” (Africafocus.org, 2015).

They also claimed that the model from which the programme is drawn from (Brazilian Cerrado) bears inbuilt contradictions. This assertion was founded on the faith that challenges faced by the implementation of the Brazilian project were not addressed before propositions were made for a similar project in Nicala corridor. Therefore, ProSavanna bears the risk of inheriting the impacts as experienced in Brazil but also other locally specific consequences.

The proposal forwarded by the civil society strongly purports to speak for realities of the rural-landed-poor¹⁴. The civil society noted that some of the risks possible from this programme were integration of rural populations in global market and rise of landlessness through dislocation. However, a closer examination of solicited solutions as addressed to the three head of states (Brazil’s President Rousef, Japan’s Prime Minister Abe, and Mozambique’s Guebuza) reveals divergences within civil society and the rural-landed-poor. The opposing discourse in civil society discourse was an appeal to rural farmers quest to being sovereign and having a right to own land. This however systematically ignored the very farmers aspirations to integrate with the global economy, a promise whose viability comes alive within Pro-Savanna promise of “mutuality.”

Professionalization and formalization of civic engagement is perhaps one of the reasons that caused detach between activists and local populations. The presentation of activists was a highly formalised contestation whose accessibility was only available to few elite. The mismatch between civil society and local poor’s discourses notwithstanding, the former’s contestation underscores three concerns. One, that ProSavanna is a top-down driven policy that subsumes disproportionately the aspirations of the rural-landed-poor via utilisation of “mutuality.” Secondly, ProSavanna, wittingly or unwittingly, exacerbates the rural-landed-poor’s vulnerability by expropriation of their land. Thirdly that they condemn agrarian investment whose end product is transformation of Mozambican farmers into employees and rural labourers. These concerns have in many times been perceived to be a wholesale indicators of poor farmers detest for foreign investments in land. Often, an appeal is made for restoration of peasantry farming and agro ecological model of food production for food sovereignty¹⁵.

In 2013, the civil society deployed a “No to ProSavanna” open letters to governments of Mozambique, Japan, and Brazil urging an immediate halt to the project. The response of Paulo Zucula, the minister for Transport and Communications, was provocative and seemed to demean the anti-campaign for ProSavanna. Zucula dismissed the letter as “not written by the peasants” stating “if they had, he would know that illiteracy ended in Mozambique”.

This debate recasts the necessity to articulate the context and voices from below more appropriately. An appreciation of “the will to improve” by the peasants cannot be adequately found in the civil society rhetoric or their unquestionable commitment to ProSavanna project. Their actions needs to be interpreted through an understanding of historical processes that have had consequences on the peasantry such as a confrontation with the harsh reality of famine and dwindling value of land and food production as discussed earlier.

Furthermore, an argument based on some of the rural farmers testimonies has shown deficiencies that exist in the discourses of representation championed by activists. It is insufficient to assert that the rural-landed-poor are unwaveringly committed to peasantry farming and agro ecological model of food production. Organized protest and activism obscures the logic in acquiescence of expropriation by the rural-landed-poor that often elucidate believability and trust in the promise of “mutuality.” While organised activism in form of unions such as UNAC have implied that the quest for rural-landed-poor is to generate traditional means of food production for their sustainability they have ignored the urgency in which the landed poor wants to utilise land related policies offered by the state, however flawed, to engage “equally” as “mutual” partners in global capital flows by the help of land investments.

From the testimonials of the peasants, we derive a narrative that supports a preference of investors as a result of poor market value. During the World Church Conference in December 2016, Maria Paulo lamented that, “a group of white people came and explained something, but it was not clear. In the beginning, we had hope in ProSavanna. We have natural resources, but no infrastructure and support. We do not produce even enough for subsistence. But now we are lost.”

Similarly, the guardian piece on January 2014 (the Guardian, 2014) and InterPress Service of May 2013 (Ipsnews.net, 2015) referred to the stories of Radolfo Razao and Brigida Mohamad, both small holders who were disenfranchised through national agrarian investment. They both lament that their land is not up for sale. These voices resonate with activism based on ProSavanna project which point out to likelihood of land related conflicts intensification, dispossession, and displacement. The rural-landed-poor’s interest in agrarian interests in this perspective is seen as in favour of customary farming methods, at least in response to the aforesaid threats to land. Although the activists uses such voices as attempts to show their solidarity of local populations in antagonism, Maria also expresses a state of shattered hopes.

Testimonials of farmers in support of dislocation thesis, mainly articulated by activists, is in stark contrast with local farmers who attempted to historicise collapse of traditional food crops (maize, cassava, pumkins, and sweet potatoes) due to unpredictable severe climatic

Table 1. Samples of interview.

Name	Chrisitna Armando	Antonio Tambwe	Simbarashe Mapie
Comment	<p>“The good thing about this project is that I hear we can make more crops to sell [cash crops]. That is a good thing because all of us produce same thing, which rich people do not want to buy [cassava]. You see, if these white people [investors] help us to produce soybeans, we can sell it to other countries and get good money. Those who have land can be given money [compensated]. Those who do not have land can be employed. Our community will be rich. Now we suffer because we cannot sell our cassava.”</p>	<p>“It is better to let the government allow these development people (investors) to help us. Before they came, we did not have roads. Now we have started to see some projects coming up. I think it is a good thing.”</p>	<p>“When we are lucky we produce a lot of maize and cassava. But if draught comes, we have no help. This year the cassava produced was too much. I had to travel to the market everyday to sell. There was not much money. Because a lot of people had plenty of cassava so they did not need to buy.”</p>

conditions. These observations from the local farmers have important insights on dissenting voices that is always not present in the discourse of activism. When we talked to these farmers through the phone, they emphasized that they spoke for majority of their colleagues. Here are some of the few interviews we sampled (Table 1).

These farmers underscored the need to consider the harsh living conditions as facilitating their desire to integrate with the global agrarian capital flows. Economic stagnancy as arising from low productivity, high cost of living, and marketisation of all aspects of Mozambicans is a key leading factor that explores the ambitious nature of the rural-landed-poor to assimilate the vision of transnational investment. Data on droughts, crop failures and disasters (WFP, 2010) appears to support the assertions of the farmers. Such an experience has not made the landed poor to yearn towards the need to stabilise traditional means of farming. Rather, it has lead to the need to integrate.

Consequently, the poor productivity has only acted as a catalyst to search alternatives (FAO, 2010). Poor crop production is also because of poor infrastructure, lack of appropriate technology, and lack of markets. This has only exacerbated the rural-landed-poor's vulnerability. In the cases where the promise of “mutuality” encountered farmers faced with low productive pieces of land, the choices have been focused on interested investors. This in itself proves that the rural-landed-poor desire to fully utilise land asset. The claim of underutilisation as a justification to land acquisition by transnational cooperations therefore fails to capture the very essence of desirability by the rural-landed-poor to utilise land by giving it up to for investment.

CONCLUSION

Having analysed the use of “mutuality” by Japan, this study was interested in investigating the “goodwill” of mutuality as perceived by receiving partners. This kind of investigation was possible through an articulation of

perceptions of the world created by such discourses and its adaptability to the local livelihoods. This paper attempted to show the manner in which the poor interpreted the discourse of “mutuality” as used by development partners.

Often, the policies spearheaded by the state provide means of expropriation of peasant land. In popular scholarship on land grabbing cases from Africa, peasant's response is usually presented in forms of resistance and revolt. This work has problematised notions of resistance and revolts highlighting the role of silences or disquiets in economic thrust of poor rural landowners. I have argued that peasantry has diligently supported the state's pursuit of investment.

As an exercise to promote investment, the states in Africa have overseen diverse land reforms. Such reforms are carried within the neoliberal banner, and have encouraged deregulations and capital restrictions that support influx of TNCs. Interventions of governments in Africa have therefore liberalised land access to encourage investments.

Through the forums of activism during TICAD V in 2013 based on ProSavanna project we pointed out that means of representation for the rural-landed-poor within civil society while characteristically insufficient, and misappropriating rural-landed-poor's aspirations has gained hegemony in global land grabbing debate. However, study of indigenous communities in areas of development targeted by “mutuality” as a concept that has only sought to cooperate, and negotiate with the state elites, proved insufficiency in representation of rural-landed-poor's authentic interests.

The documents and speeches in TICAD, JICA, and MOFA which underscores and utilises “mutuality” in ministering aid targeted to Africa when contrasted with voices of dissonance as rising from rural-landed-poor in Mozambique, lead to a conclusion that both NGOs and Civil Societies tended to misrepresent authentic aspirations of the rural-landed-poor. The campaigns orchestrated by NGOs and Civil Society nevertheless facilitate a critical partial understanding of contexts of the rural-landed-poor. MOFA (2009) interpretation of

“mutuality” sees it as “their own issue”. This has become problematic since the perception of the rural-landed-poor about “mutuality” is often in profit equilibrium. They expect inclusion that would make them gain from their own assets assisted by foreign investors.

To assert that the local voices are not as articulated by the civil society is not to suggest that there is no single element of their concern within contestation of global civil society. We have considered evidence from within Mozambican land contestation as organised by civil society as in parts displaying the wish and aspirations of the rural-landed-poor. This study included a brief investigation of the nature of this involvement by inquiring on why the rural-landed-poor seem to be in favour of foreign led interventionism. Although most civil society centralises on contestation based on dispossession, this study found that most rural-landed-poor welcomed foreign investments despite being aware of their own misappropriation.

This research re-affirms the need to address issues of land grabbing. In essence, we have noted that Nacala Corridor is an open example of land grabbing by cooperation among states, international corporations, and private investors. To address the issues pertaining land facing the rural-landed-poor we note that perspectives emerging from organised activism fail to capture the quest of rural-landed-poor to integrate in global capital flows. This quest is facilitated by the promise of “mutuality” outlined in foreign investment policies.

The rural-landed-poor’s apprehension of “mutuality” is an act of complimentary. In this way, rural-landed-poor fail to read what the investors think of their land; as under-utilised. Perhaps because, that they do not fathom it as such in the first place. On the other hand, the investment partners do not see “mutuality” as possessing elements of incorporating the poor into global market flows. On the contrary, “mutuality” is a discourse only familiar to state elites and their colleagues in the private, cooperate sector. “Mutuality” is a false concept that that seems to emphasise market based approaches to poverty reduction and food security.

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

The author has not declared any conflict of interests.

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¹ Conventional model of development here refers to Western aid regime, which has been criticized due to its colonizing character.

² The first conference (TICAD I) took place in 1993. During the event, the organizers vowed to reverse the decline in development assistance for Africa, which had followed the end of the Cold War. Participants adopted the Tokyo Declaration on African Development, committing to the pursuit of various goals among them political and economic reforms in Africa, increased private sector development, regional cooperation and integration, and the harnessing of Asian experience for the benefit of African development.

The second conference (TICAD II) followed five years after in 1998. It renewed the commitment to Africa's development challenges with another set of ambitious goals such as poverty reduction and integration of Africa into the global economy as primary themes. One of the key outcomes of TICAD II was culmination to adoption of the Tokyo Agenda for Action (TAA). The TAA outlined a framework of cooperation in the TICAD process identifying shared goals, objectives and guidelines for actions to be taken by Africa and its partners.

In 2003, the third conference (TICAD III) took place once again in Tokyo. Some of the keys emerging outcomes from Tokyo conference were an explicit commitment for the TICAD Initiative to support the African Union's New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD). Incorporation of African Union was a major achievement towards legitimising the role of TICAD process in Africa. The number of head of states from the African continent was significantly important element to TICAD process. In total, 23 head of states participated and 10 heads of international organizations. TICAD III was heralded as one of the largest international conferences on African development. It was utterly clear that by this time the networking around TICAD process was growing wider. On the other hand, the major achievement of the meeting was the adoption of a blueprint for Africa's peace and socio-economic growth and development plan.

After more than a decade of previous conferences held in Tokyo, TICAD IV shifted to Yokohama as a host City. Yokohama's theme was to foster a vibrant Africa; it addressed the following three priority areas: Boosting economic growth; Ensuring "human security", including the achievement of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and the consolidation of peace and democratisation; and Addressing environmental issues and climate change.

June 2103 the fifth TICAD was held in Yokohama. This time, the basic theme was heralded as "hand in hand with a dynamic Africa". TICAD V recorded the highest number of participants, becoming one of the highest levels of international conferences hosted by Japan. It culminated to Yokohama Declaration 2013, which stimulates the future direction of Africa development and road map so specific measures to be undertaken between 2013 and 2017. For further details see <http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/africa/ticad/>

³ The 2013 Yokohama declaration reaffirmed that TICAD role is to facilitate Africa inclusiveness in international affairs. It renewed the twin principles of African ownership and partnership in which TICAD process is rooted. The strategic approach was highlighted as working "hand in hand with a more dynamic Africa". This work has conceptualised this notion as "Mutuality".

⁴ Self-help (Jijō) has been used to mean that countries where development is targeted should formulate their own programs. Japan would only respond to such models drawn up by recipient countries. This model entrusts receiving governments as possessing capability to rightfully judge and project the context of the poor. The policy formulated is also perceived to be a representation of aspirations of the poor.

⁵ Srinivas argues that historical perceptions of NGOs has changed, and that there lacks any single way to understand NGOs. In international development, NGOs have enormously been perceived as independent bodies with unquestionable commitment to development focused on understanding the needs and context of the poor communities. His work calls us to question what he terms as over-conceptualisation on NGOs as representative of the people. Importantly, he also asserts that we should analyse concepts of power in mobilisation of knowledge.

⁶ Chatterjee defines Civil Society: "the closed association of modern elite groups, sequestered from the wider popular life of communities, walled up within enclaves of civic freedom and rational law" He calls for new locus of determining the negotiation and contestation of poor as a political society. Political society is a site of negotiation and contestation opened up by the activities of governmental agencies aimed at population groups (Chatterjee 2004:74). To effectively make its claim in political society, a population group produced by governmentality must be invested with the moral content

of community. Community here means the "conferred legitimacy within the domain of the modern state only in the form of the nation" (Chatterjee 2004:75). This is central to what is meant by governmentality: there are numerous possibilities for transforming an empirically assembled population group into the morally constituted form of a community. (Chatterjee, 2004).

⁷ Throughout its 20 year history, TICAD has emphasised its role to popularise Africa's potentials and risks at the global stage as seen in declarations issued during the quinquennial conferences. This was reiterated during TICAD V's Yokohama declaration. The concept identified as "mutuality" in this paper is expressed in TICAD process through range of words such as twin principles of Africa ownership and partnership, hand in hand with Africa, partnership, among others. Available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/page3e_000053.html

⁸ Grain is an NGO that supports small farmers and their struggles for subsistence farming. See more details at <https://www.grain.org/>

⁹ Rural-landed-poor have been implied here to refer to mainly farming populations living in rural areas. They are characteristically poor using World Bank poverty index. They however possess land, basically through inheritance, but have limited control over it for credit, technology, and skills that help harness profits attached to land.

¹⁰ Millennium Challenge funds a project in Mozambique on land tenure. For further details see <https://assets.mcc.gov/press/2012-002-1073-01-success-mozambique-land.pdf>.

¹¹ For detailed information on Borras categorization of change in land use into A1, A2, and A3 see; http://www.tni.org/sites/www.tni.org/files/borras_franco_joac_2012.pdf

¹² This discussion should not be conflated with the claims of peasantry land as under-utilized. It is aimed at highlighting the challenges implicit to peasantry farming. Unlike the assertions made to encourage foreign related investments and large-scale crop farming, this description aims sole at showing that peasantry has been driven into a state of despair due to poor farm produce. This should not be under any circumstances used to justify incursions that destroy social fabric and renders obsolete the local livelihoods.

Sources of Land use based on FAO that ascertain these claim states in part; The total land area of Mozambique, excluding rivers and inland waters, is about 784,000 sq. km. The FAO estimates that about 360,000 sq. km (36 million ha) is cultivable, but the area cultivated for arable and permanent crops was estimated to be only 4.9 million ha in 2003. The amount of irrigated land is recorded as 0.11 million ha but nearly two-thirds of this is not currently irrigated. A detailed assessment of land cover carried out in 1995 by the FAO, reported that only 1 million ha was under permanent cultivation while a further 10 million ha was used for short fallow shifting cultivation and 9.1 million ha for long fallow shifting cultivation. Areas of open and wooded grassland and shrub account for 21.5 million ha, much of which is suitable for livestock if not for conversion to permanent cropping.

¹³ Japan has played a significant role in post-cold war Mozambique's transition from war to peace and economic advancement (Owoeye, 1992, Sato 1994, Morikawa, 1997, and JICA, 2000). Mozambique economic cooperation with Japan accounted for loans amounting to 17.149, grants amounting to 93.145, and technical assistance totaling to 15.338 billion yen in fiscal year 2012. Exports to Mozambique amounted to 26.02 while imports were 6.22 billion yen in fiscal year 2013 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2015). This assistance took place at the backdrop of structural and political changes spurred by international donor agencies pressure (SAPs).

A specific character of Japan aid regime in post cold war Mozambique is not overtly within the structural adjustment discourse. On the contrary, "mutuality" as emerging within TICAD process after the cold war assumes the overtones of humanitarian focus in development. Humanitarian aspect is politically unconditional. Thus, in the case of Mozambique, notions of humanitarian nature of aid have tended to arouse sympathy but most important necessitating interventions (Duffield & Donini, 2014). Development interventions such as ProSavana project resonate with TICAD's main pillars; human centred development, poverty reduction through economic growth, and consolidation of peace (MOFA, 2013). These two areas have translated into a focus on agriculture, social sector, and human resource development.

Investment in agriculture often time translates to frontier portions of land in the rural areas. Rural populations, who account for more than 50% of the country's population, makes up the majority of poor. Agriculture is the single most important source of livelihood for such populations. At the same time

rural population agricultural activities contribute the highest percentage of the national GDP and provides almost 80% employment opportunities. The deplorable levels of poverty in Mozambique have necessitated counter poverty measures and strategies. MOFA has notably argued that it prioritises rural development in Mozambique (De Medeiros Carvalho, 2011). The frontier land in the rural Mozambique has therefore become a zone for conflicting theatrics between the poor and the state. Although both have viewed resources as core to the fight against poverty, the rural-landed-poor in have also sought to engage in global capital through utilising land. The state's means to resources accessibility by development partners has thrived on the notions of "mutuality. Following a restoration of peace in Mozambique, initiation of new land policy by the government (Tanner & Durang, 2002) assured rights of the locals to land ownership but also facilitated access of land for the purposes of investment.

The basic characteristic of land reforms (1997) was; a) affirmation of state centrality in land ownership, b) facilitation of land accessibility (mainly to foreign investors) and c) engendering of land issues specific reference to women ownership of land. These particular aspects bring into question the role of locals in land management. A strong state centred land policy puts into question the functionality of customary land management. Tanner & Durang (2002) noted that the customary laws had to be incorporated into national land policy. This study however note that land relations between the locals radically changed when incorporated into the state led policy. The role of customary laws was not compatible with the agribusiness oriented land policy. It only therefore helped to bolster the ambiguity embedded in the market centred land policy. An investigation into the role-played by customary law points us to imbalances evident in "mutual benefit" rhetoric. Whereas the law approved in 1997 (World Bank, 2008) recognises the place of family accessibility and management of land, and also confers some form of authority in overseeing transfers and inheritance rights and conflicts resolution, it fails to candidly appropriate means through which customary laws would engage foreign investors. To the eyes of foreign investors, customary laws are not only inexistent, but also lack capacitation to validate strong negotiation. The imbalances in "mutual benefits" are evident in lack of mechanisms and means within which the rural-landed-poor can negotiate with the foreign investors. This has in most cases left the locals at the mercies of the state to negotiate on their behalf. It must be noted that it is not lack of inclusion of the locals that is the main issue. For example DUAT (World Bank, 2009) shows that local people have been given rights of participation in legislating land issues. Also, investors have been said to engage with locals to secure investments. The issue is however the imbalances as a result of local's inability to fully access land in terms of harnessing reward of resources. Access therefore needs an expanded view. IncurSION of foreign investment exacerbates the quest to improve. Since the prevailing means of land use have had low yield, incorporation into "better" methods of land use becomes the best viable way out. When this need meets the discourse that not only promises incorporation but also mutual benefits, the rural-landed-poor are subjected to inescapable state of need to cooperate.

The nature of dialogues on land has had its toll on local's attitude towards investors. In ProSavana case in Manica Province, Tanner & Durang (2002) has shown that local consultations between investors and local communities rarely exceeded half a day (in Durang, 1999). That these consultations take such a short time proves the farcicality embedded in "mutuality." This attitude can reveal either locals eagerness to assimilate foreign investors or the investors desire to exploit perceived ignorance among the locals. This quick fix remedy can also be interpreted within the state's requirements to quicken the process allowing investors to access the land in not more than 90 days. The outcome of this has been that the locals are often ill prepared to receive foreign investors in terms of awareness and knowledge of investment. This must however also be seen from the perspective that the locals are also eager to facilitate investment especially so as to attain the stature of the promise in "mutuality" which befits enthroned communities. Community representation is often through use of selected few, "the informed." It is highly improbable to claim that they aspire for global civil society voices, which rightly appropriates local practices.

Rural-landed-poor as analyzed in this paper support as urgent the essence of combating poverty as well as promoting sustainable development. Their voices appear as represented in civil society and religious organizations in Mozambique. They have been given audience by both the local and global media. Through discussions at local level, Mozambican civil society points out discrepancies and contradictions that they asserted shows defects in design of Prosavanna programme (Africafocus.org, 2015). These discrepancies were pointed out as irregularities in consultation and participation, threats of usurpation of rural populations, and removal of communities from the land they have traditionally inherited and currently occupy. Critiques within the conduct of international agrarian development in Africa reflects wider consensus that they intend to make "life easier" by means that overall benefits the corporate interests. This will be carried out while damaging rural livelihoods and interests of rural-landed-poor. This consensus does not however contend that they should be excluded from agricultural development; at least not in terms of "genuine voices" of the rural-landed-poor. The dissenting voices within the civil society activism resonate with rural-landed-poor's voices but calls for further engagement with their acquiescence.

¹⁴ From the open letter of Mozambican peasant farmers that was presented to Japan's Prime Minister, Shinzo there is outline of key issues that the rural-landed-poor are not interested in is outlined. The images that validate usurpation of land are depiction of images of unproductivity, need for large scale cultivation for export purposes, and the problem of co-operates forms of land investment. The minister of transport, Paulo Zikula, in response to this letter alluded that most Mozambican farmers are indeed "illiterate." (Japantoday.com, 2013) This point reveals what was pointed earlier, that alliance between states elite who implies "mutuality" limits the ability for articulating rural-landed-poor's aspirations. Reference to rural-landed-poor as "illiterates" serve to validate need for representation. Representation itself comes in form of unions, civil society, and state officials all of which belong to a class of elite. This assimilation of forms of meanings and representation as used in development related activism is not adequately analyzed. Locating rural-landed-poor's quest and desire to be integrated into global market flows finds home in the promise of "mutuality," unveiled the fact that it does not aspire what proponents of mutuality intends. Whereas those in donor regime see establishment of large scale industrial firms that lead to mass production of food for export purposes, the rural-landed-poor understands campaigns for mutual benefit as empowerment and efficient strategies that enable suffice local production of food but also facilitate markets for the surplus.

¹⁵ Food sovereignty is a global alliance for farmers and other stakeholders that claim for communities control over the way food is produced, traded and consumed. It could create a food system that is designed to help people and the environment rather than make profits for multinational corporations.

Full Length Research Paper

Factors contributing to irregular migration: A case of Kasulu District, Tanzania

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Received 20 November, 2016; Accepted 7 April, 2017

Despite the fact that irregular migrants (IRMs) have often been facing a lot of challenges in sustaining their livelihood in Kasulu District, yet in recent years, there has been an increase of IRMs from within and outside Kasulu District in search of casual labour in the local community. The study therefore was undertaken in four villages in Kasulu, Kitanga, Kagera-Nkanda, Mvugwe and Nyachenda. Specifically, the study aimed to determine the driving factors of irregular migration, to assess smallholder farmer's attitude towards IRMs, and finally, to identify how the IRMs are affected by their interaction with smallholder farmers in Kasulu District. The study on which the paper is based used a cross-sectional research design whereby data was collected at one point and time. The study employed random sampling, purposive and snowball sampling techniques to get 120 respondents. Data were collected using a questionnaire, key informant interviews, focus group discussions and direct observations. Quantitative data were analysed using statistical package for social science (SPSS) whereby descriptive statistics were determined. Qualitative data were analysed using content analysis. The results show social, cultural, economical and political factors are responsible for the irregular migration observed in Kasulu District. It is thus recommended that, the immigration department and other security organs working along the border should establish several entry posts either permanently or mobile along the country borders to deter IRMs and ease visa issuance process for those migrants wishing to enter the country legally.

Key words: Irregular migration, Kasulu, Tanzania.

INTRODUCTION

From the beginning of human history people have been moving from one place to another and this mobility is a common phenomenon to this day. What has changed is the formation of states, nations, alliances, and establishment of sovereignty, citizenship, borders as well as laws, which among other functions, have been used to

govern and control the movements and settlement of people from one country to another (Ahlberg and Runell, 2009). Available literature on irregular migrants (IRMs) describes irregular migration as a common and necessary feature of modern life which is universally acknowledged and has extensively contributed to the

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development of different societies worldwide in the form of farm cheap labour (Mattson, 2008). However, studies on irregular migration are constrained by inaccurate data (Mouaatamid, 2010; Koser, 2005). Moreover, it was estimated that by the year 2010, that about 214 to 321 million people (10 to 15%) of the world's total population were international IRMs living irregularly outside their countries of birth (IOM, 2010). According to the UNHCR (2001) statistical yearbook, only 40% of all the persons of concern to the UNHCR worldwide were living in refugee camps. About 47% of the people were either dispersed in rural areas or were in places not specified. Literature on IRMs shows that strict barriers on legal entry of irregular migration have been placed by many states worldwide; there is however a large number of irregular migrants in different countries who are used as cheap labourers (Patrick and Geronimi, 2003).

Tanzania shares borders with eight surrounding states most of which have at one point or another experienced conflicts which have produced refugees who sought refuge in Tanzania (Rutinwa, 2005). However, not all of those fleeing their countries come through the official channels as per UNHCR's guidelines and due to the porous nature of Tanzania's borders many IRMs have found their way into the country. In addition, the high degree of cultural affinity within the Great Lakes region makes it easier for some IRMs (Johnson, 2008; URT, 2010). Moreover, due to Tanzania's lack of adequate resources and capacity to patrol her borders irregular migration from the neighbouring war torn countries of Burundi, Rwanda and Democratic Republic of Congo can go unchecked (UNHCR, 2006; IOM, 2010; Mouaatamid, 2010).

Since 1972, following the civil war in Burundi about 300,000 Burundians were estimated to have spontaneously settled in Tanzanian villages along the border between Tanzania and Burundi. These were the refugees who have been either living in the local villages or getting outside refugee camps irregularly for several years, very often without formalising their stay, working and movement status (Rutinwa, 2005; Jennifer, 2007; Johnson, 2008). Existing literature (Johnson, 2008; URT, 2010), explicitly shows that, irregular migration in Tanzania is not simply a concern for only those who come into the country, but also those who exit from the refugee camps and for those who refuse to leave the country. It has also been stated that, some of these IRMs have established their own homes, are owning or renting land and are involved in farming as casual labourers, livestock keepers, rendering human labour to farmers in the rural areas, and others are married to Tanzanians without legal documents that allow them to engage in the above-mentioned activities (NRC, 2006; Jacob, 2009; URT, 2010).

Generally, from an economic perspective literature shows that irregular migration is actually quite useful in many states of destination due to liberalization of their

economies which in one way or another leads to the demand of various forms of skilled and semi-skilled labourers for which irregular migration becomes a potential source (Koser, 2005; Berry, 2008). However, IRMs more often than not end up facing lots of challenges. For example in Kasulu District; they end up being a source of hard labour in agricultural related activities, receiving poor remuneration in return, harsh treatment and being subjected to deportation (NRC, 2006; Mouaatamid, 2010; URT, 2010). Despite the above, Kasulu District has been experiencing an increase of IRMs from within and outside the district searching for casual employment in the local community (Jacob, 2009; URT, 2010; Mouaatamid, 2010). Nonetheless, existing literature on irregular migration in Tanzania has limited information on IRMs, as it does not explicitly provide empirical evidence on what drives the irregular migration while there are official channels of entering another state even under conditions of war or social strife. Therefore, the study on which the paper is based aimed to fill this knowledge gap. In addition, findings from the study could shed some light on the unknown factors behind irregular migration in Kasulu District thus helping the central and local government, UNHCR, and other stakeholders interested in migration and its socio-economic importance to both the IRMs and host local community.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Description of the study area

Kasulu District is one of the three districts of Kigoma Region. It comprises seven divisions with 30 wards divided into 92 villages and covers approximately 9324 km². The district borders Burundi to the West for about 150 km porous land border, a large game reserve (Moyowosi) to the East. To the North-East it shares borders with Kibondo District and Kigoma District to the South. The study was carried out in five wards namely Kitanga, Nyamidaho, Kagerankanda, Nyachenda and Kitagata. Kasulu District was selected because of hosting both irregular migrants who are estimated to be over 15,000 (URT, 2010) and the long term refugees residing in Kasulu villages since 1972 (Most of these have been moving and working from one village to another without legal documents allowing them to travel, stay or work while in Kasulu).

Kasulu District also hosts, Burundian refugees who arrived since 1993 and who are still living in refugee camps and unwilling to repatriate voluntarily to Burundi. These refugees have been observed moving out of their camps to nearby villages in search of employment as casual labourers without official documents. In addition, as pointed earlier Kasulu district has a long porous border with only one official entry point. Consequently, this has led to large numbers of IRMs coming directly from Burundi in search for employment (as casual labourers) in the villages. Furthermore, agriculture being a major livelihood source of local communities has led to high demand of cheap labourers and presumably the increase of IRMs.

Research design, sampling and sample size

The study adopted a cross-sectional research design; the design was the most appropriate for the study on which the current paper

is based. Generally, the design is less costly and allows one to collect the required data in a relatively short period of time. According to Bailey (1998), the design is useful for descriptive purposes as well as for determination of relationship between and among variables and it allows a researcher to collect data at one point in time. The study's population included all IRMs (non-citizens) employed by smallholder farmers in the studied villages (Kitanga, Nyamidaho, Kagera-nkanda, Nyachenda and Kitagata), smallholder farmers who employ the IRMs and those who did not.

According to Bailey (1998), the minimum sample or sub sample for a research in which statistical data analysis is to be done is thirty (30) cases. Therefore, the study used 120 respondents from four villages. To obtain the above sample, a combination of three different sampling techniques, was adopted, that is, purposive sampling, simple random sampling and snowball sampling. Purposive sampling was used in selecting two divisions out of the available seven, four wards out of thirty and four villages out of ninety, all the above have a high number of IRMs. Key informants and participants to focus group discussions were selected purposively. Simple random sampling was used to get the respondents from the households employing IRMs in agricultural production and those not. Snowball sampling was used to get prominent IRMs who were living and employed by smallholder farmers as cheap labourers but who were hard to find through purposive and simple random sampling as they did not stick with one farmer in one place.

Data collection

Data was collected using a pre-structured questionnaire with open and close ended questions. Generally, before the actual household survey a pilot study to pre-test the questionnaire was undertaken in three villages after getting the required clearance from Sokoine University of agriculture, the District Commissioner's Office and from the Village governments'. The pilot aimed at testing the reliability and validity of the data collections tools in terms of precision, objectivity and relevancy. Based on the findings, some revisions were made to the questionnaire.

In addition to the above, data collected through the questionnaire were complemented by information collected through direct observations, in-depth interviews with key informants and the focus group discussions (FGDs). All these aimed at allowing triangulation of the study findings. Overall, five FGDs were conducted; these normally involved eight participants each. In addition to the above, 16 in-depth interviews were conducted, four for each of the selected village. The key informants for the in-depth interviews included village leaders, extension officers, teachers, land officers, forest officers, immigration officers, refugees' officers, auxiliary police, militia personnel, and IRMs. FGD participants were got through the help of village/hamlet/IRMs leaders. As pointed out earlier the KIs and FGDs aimed at complementing the information gathered from the household surveys. Generally, the research adhered to ethical considerations whereby participation was on a voluntary basis and respondents were assured of their anonymity in relation to the information shared

Data analysis

The study's unit of analysis was the household. Quantitative data collected through the questionnaires were edited, summarised, coded and thereafter analysed using the statistical package for social science (SPSS). SPSS was used to determine descriptive statistics, that is, frequencies, percentages. In addition, the Likert scale was used to determine the smallholder farmers' attitude towards IRMs. On the other hand qualitative data was analysed using content analysis whereby qualitative information from the key

informant interviews and FGDs was summarized and organized into meaningful themes. Generally, the qualitative information has been used in this paper to complement what was collected through the questionnaire.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Respondents demographic and socio-economic characteristics

The sex of the household head in the family may influence the status of the household in accessing both casual labour and self-employment in agricultural activities. The results in Table 1 show that 87.5, 77.5 and 85% of household for smallholder farmers employing IRMs, those not using IRMs and IRMs were headed by males. On the other hand, 12.5, 22.5 and 15.5% of household for smallholder farmers employing IRMs, those not using IRMs and IRMs were headed by females. The findings show that most of those who were IRMs and working as cheap labourers were men and were similarly employed by the majority males compared to females. However, the absence of the majority female labour force in some agricultural activities can have profound effects on the output as the majority were women left in charge of the households.

Results in Table 1 show that most (82.5%) respondents' age ranged between 15 and 47 years thus suggesting the majority were in the economically active group bearing main responsibilities for the household livelihoods. The findings are similar to the argument put forward by Rutasitara (2002) the age of an individual has an influence on productivity and is a factor that can explain the level of production and efficiency and that the children and the old tend to be less active in economic activities than those in the middle age who are active, aggressive and motivated by the needs of their families.

Focusing on the marital status of the respondents Table 1 show that less than a quarter (22.5%) and over a third (70%) of smallholder farmers who employed IRM, and both those not hiring IRM, and the IRMs respectively were living as singles. About three quarters (72.5%) of those employing IRMs, and 27.5% of both smallholder farmers not hiring IRMs and the IRMs were married. According to Table 1 the percentage of the single IRMs is higher than that of smallholder farmers. This could simply be due to the nature and life of the majority of single IRMs, such that they lack family responsibilities, thus making them more flexible to move and hence easily available for employment as casual labourers by smallholder farmers.

Table 1 further shows that 12.5%, of the household of smallholder farmers employing IRMs, and about two third (65.5%) of IRMs interviewed had between 1 to 3 people. While 42.5 and 25% of the same categories of respondents had 4 to 7 people, another 45 and 12.5% of smallholder farmers employing IRMs and IRMs had 8 and

Table 1. Respondents demographic and socio-economic characteristics (n=120).

Characteristic		Smallholder farmers employing IRMs (n _E = 40)	Smallholder farmers not employing IRMs (n _{NE} = 40)	Irregular migrants (n _{IRM} = 40)
Respondent's sex	Male	35 (87.5)	31 (77.5)	34 (85.0)
	Female	5 (12.5)	9 (22.5)	6 (15.0)
Age categories	15- 25	3 (7.5)	1 (2.5)	5 (12.5)
	26 -36	10 (25.0)	9 (22.5)	17 (42.5)
	37- 47	16 (40.0)	17 (42.5)	11 (27.5)
	>47	11 (27.5)	13 (32.5)	7 (17.5)
Marital status	Not married	9 (22.5)	28 (70.0)	28 (70.0)
	Married	29 (72.5)	11 (27.5)	11 (27.5)
	Divorced	2 (5.0)	1 (2.5)	1 (2.5)
Household size	1-3	5 (12.5)	10 (25.0)	25 (62.5)
	4- 7	17 (42.5)	14 (35.0)	10 (25.0)
	8 and above	18 (45.0)	16 (40.0)	5 (12.5)
	Minimum	2	2	1
	Maximum	13	12	8
	Average	7.15	6.65	3.25
Main economic activity	Farming	31 (87.5)	34 (85)	32 (80)
	Charcoal making	1 (2.5)	1 (2.5)	2 (5)
	Logging	4 (2.5)	1 (2.5)	5 (12.5)
	Livestock keeping	3 (7.5)	4 (10)	1 (2.5)
Education level	No formal education	8 (20)	7 (17.5)	33 (82.5)
	Primary education	26 (65)	28 (70)	6 (15)
	Secondary education	6 (15)	5 (12.5)	1 (2.5)

n_E = Number of respondents employing IRMs; n_{NE} = Number of respondents not employing IRMs; n_{IRM} = Number of IRMs. Numbers in bracket indicate percent.

more than 8 people in their households. On the other hand about 62% of IRMs households had 1 to 3 members. This might be due to the fact that most IRMs are either single or married but do not stay with their families due to their temporal nature of living in farm areas, hence their easy movement.

Study results as presented in Table 1 show that agriculture is the main economic activity of the respondents whereby more than four fifths (87.7 and 85%) of the surveyed households both employing IRMs and those not had agriculture as they main economic activity. The study also revealed that the majority IRMs are engaged in farming activities as casual labourers, this probably might be due to the fact that they have neither capital nor other alternatives to earn a life. This observation is in line with Bastian and Don (2009) who pointed out that employers have more power over most IRM workers than other workers, as the majority of IRM workers rely on their employers for their continuing stay in alien country. The study findings present a typical lifestyle in a Tanzanian rural area, since over 85% of the respondents interviewed were engaged in farming

activities. The results are consistent with the KDS (2010) profile which estimates that about 90% of the local communities are engaged in agricultural activities for their livelihood.

Ones literacy level is very useful for smallholder farmers and IRMs choice of a livelihood strategy and his/her productivity in general. Those with better education may easily be able to grasp and implement whatever skills provided to them such as using modern technology in agriculture and employment in general. As it was expected prior to the study, the illiteracy rate was expected to be higher in rural areas; the results in Table 1 show a very high illiteracy level in the surveyed area. Majority of both smallholder farmers employing and those who do not employ IRMs and the IRMs, which is equivalent to 65.5, 70 and 15% of total respondents had primary school education, those with secondary education school were, 15, 12.5 and 2.5% respectively for the total respondents employing and those not employing IRMs and the IRMs. The findings of this study show that the majority 82.5% of the IRMs had no formal education and lacked employable skills which could

Table 2. Reasons for irregular migration (n=40).

Reasons for irregular migration (n=40)	Frequency	Percent
Looking for employment as agricultural labourers	35	87.5
Seeking Business	1	2.5
In search of grazing land for livestock keeping	3	7.5
Looking for area for permanent residence	9	22.5
Land scarcity and associated problems	38	95.0
Social and cultural unrest in Burundi	14	35.0
Social exclusion of refugees in the camp	8	20.0
Sporadic political and civil war	8	20.0
Incentives given by smallholder farmers	38	95.0

enable them to be absorbed in the formal job market; hence, they depend mostly on working as farmers' cheap labourers or in agricultural activities for their livelihood.

Causes of irregular migration

The first objective of the study on which this paper is based was to determine the driving factors for irregular migration. As stipulated in this study there is no clear answer to the reasons of irregular migration. Table 2 presents these factors as pointed out by the IRMS themselves. The results show that the leading factors for irregular migration in the study area include, land scarcity in their country of origin and the incentives given by smallholder farmers in Kasulu; this was reported by 95% of the respondents. The results also show that looking for employment as cheap labourers in agriculture was another reason for irregular migration; this was reported by 87.5% of the respondents. Social and cultural unrest in the country of origin were reported by 14% of the respondents, while 9% of the respondents cited looking for permanent residence as among the reasons for irregular migration. Other reasons are as shown in Table 2. According to Bojadžijev (2005) irregular immigration may be prompted by the desire to escape civil war or repression in the country of origin such as persecution, frequent abuse, oppression, and genocide which opens up a new social space and fields of conflict in the host country.

Through the FGDs and in-depth interviews, it was pointed out that when refugees face restrictions in relation to income generating activities in the refugee camps they are often left with no other choice but to compete for jobs in the host communities. Consequently, the above results into smallholder farmers getting cheap labourers who are then used in farm expansion. The quote below supports the reason for having IRMs in Kasulu District:

"...Such things as lack of travelling documents and freedom of movement outside refugee camp, lack of both

work permit and freedom of engaging in any paid or unpaid activities are some of the factors for irregular migration" (A 32 years old male, Mvugwe village).

Other factors as mentioned by discussants included lack of refugee identity cards, inadequate food and other humanitarian aid issued in the camp, these collectively forced them to irregularly get out of their camps in search of casual employment and sometimes they establish permanent residence outside refugee camps. The findings are similar to those provided by Düvell and Jordan (2003) who report that IRMs sometimes manage to live undiscovered for many years, gain relatively comfortable living standards and become active members of the host society whilst still being liable to detention, removal or deportation once identified. The results conform to what was pointed out by some key informants as shown in the following quote:

"Life is not as simple in Burundi as some of you think. I experienced land problems before even we fled to DRC and later to Tanzania. When I lived with my parents in Burundi, we did not possess or inherit land. Our life in Burundi was more or less the same as servitude under the system known as 'Nyarubanja system". My parents and entire family were forced to live and work as cheap labourers, farming and grazing cattle for a certain Hutu man who in turn used to pay us in-kind under the condition that the land was to be left to us, so that we could build and conduct our own farming. However, once we terminate the contract everything remained the property of the owner (Hutu man). "There are still lots of Burundians who live under stressful conditions, widespread poverty, and have limited access to job opportunities and land for cultivation" (A 33 year old IRM, Kitanga village).

According to Ramsey (2010) the country's social problems affect the indigenous minority, the Batwa people to an even greater extreme than the general population. The Batwa continue to live on the margins of society, suffering the highest rate of poverty,

unemployment and discrimination in Burundi. Similar incidences were also reported by another key informant who had this to say:

"I was very young to exactly recall the killing of my parents and the resultant details regarding my flight story. I remember fleeing to Tanzania due to genocide in Burundi and when I returned from grazing my parent's cattle, I found no one at home except my father's decapitated head which had been stabled with a sharp object suspected to be machete. I was really scared, trembled and immediately I started running. I heard gun fire behind me. I managed to reach Kitanga village-Tanzania with my foster grandmother whom I met by chance as we were running to Tanzania. Although we don't have permission allowing us to live legally in Tanzania, we are living peacefully while serving local smallholder farmers as cheap labourers. I am not willing or ready to be repatriated to Burundi because we heard that our perpetrators are still holding our land and I fear being killed by the same upon my return to Burundi. "I have property here in Tanzania which includes land and a few cattle, and I am married and blessed with five children." (A woman aged 36 years old from Kitanga village).

The study findings are being in line with Vollmer and Düvell (2006) who point out that reasons for being an IRM may change over time, this can happen for many reasons such as accidentally overrun their permission to stay in the country of exile or as a result of the complicated or lack of knowledge on immigration rules. Similar evidence was given during a face to face interview with one of the key informants who said:

"I fled to Tanzania from Burundi in 1993 due to political and economic turmoil. While in a refugee camp, I was approached by one of the opposition political party followers to contribute towards the battle field in Burundi. In 1994, I joined them and spontaneously repatriated back to Burundi without surrendering my ration card which assisted me in getting food and non-food items in the camp. After independence of Burundi in 2005, we, former rebel soldiers, were reintegrated into the government army and I was transferred to Ngozi region as my working Station. This was my home place, one evening after getting drunk, I went to visit my father's land and found those who had killed and taken our land still possessing it. I was in full military uniform and armed. I lost my temper and avenged my parent's death by killing two of those who killed my parents. I returned to the camp and hid, a day later, I heard police were conducting investigations over the killings and out of fear being arrested, I fled to Tanzania where I went directly to the refugee camp and found card exchange exercise in progress, where I activated my ration card and continued enjoying international protection as a refugee. However, I

didn't stay in the camp for long as I feared being tracked down by police and went to hide in a nearby local village in Kibondo District. After the closure of the Nduta Camp and relocation of refugees to Mtabila, I established myself in the camp. But I seldom stayed there as I spend most of the time in the local villages in Kasulu District where I work as a cheap labourer on farms and in logging business. The hut in the refugee camp is there just to guarantee me the food and non-food items given from time to time which I sell to Tanzanians. Even if I live in the local community, most of the time I spend on the farm with fellow refugees as my host is not comfortable to let us live with him in the main village due to lack of proper documents (a Man aged 45 years old from Nyachenda village).

Further to the above respondent's explanations, Alix-Garcia (2007) indicates that prior to 1993, refugees in Kasulu District were largely assimilated into local communities and most of them were left in local villages to date without a legal document allowing them to work, travel or reside. Generally, during the conduct of this study, it was noted that some of these IRMs interviewed were those who entered the country legally as refugees but remain irregularly in the country. During the FGDs, it was revealed that some of them were unwilling to tell the truth as to whether or not they were former refugees from one of the refugee camps; probably because they thought that the information would lead to their arrest, detention and deportation. One of them accidentally dropped down his valid ration card issued to refugees in the camp in the course of discussions.

Observations from the FGDs also show that the majority of IRMs have never possessed travel documents or work permits. The reasons given during the FGDs were that some of them were living near the border and there is no border post in both countries that was close, and where they could have reported for visa processing, the border posts are about 60 km away from their village. Concurrently, the immigration office in Burundi where they could apply for travelling documents is located very far from their home. It is also too expensive to get a book passport whose cost ranges from BIF 250,000 to 300,000, which is equivalent to 255 000 to 305 000 Tsh (Tanzanian Shillings). Travel cost to the main office in town was another impediment associated with corruption in one hand and impoverishment on the other:

"It is not easy to get a passport in Burundi due to corruption. After all, how can I bother applying for a travel document while I spend hardly fifteen minutes to reach Tanzania?" (A 29 years old IRM, Mvugwe village)

The above statement is similar to the observation by Transparency International (TI) (2007; 2010) which explains that corruption is widespread in Burundi and impedes the ability of the government to perform its basic

Table 3. Likert scale attitude results towards irregular migrants (n=80).

Statement	Farmers employing irregular migrants (n _E = 40)			Farmers not employing Irregular migrants (n _{NE} = 40)		
	Disagree (%)	Undecided (%)	Agree (%)	Disagree (%)	Undecided (%)	Agree (%)
Irregular migrants are not burden to the governments	67.5	10	22.5	57	27.5	15
Employing irregular migrants will strengthen the economy of Tanzania	55	15	30	55	20	25
Irregular migrants have not created any enmity among local community members	67.5	2.5	30	72.5	5	22.5
Smallholder farmers trust irregular migrants	42.5	15	42.5	45	22.5	32.5
Smallholder farmers create conflict on natural resources over irregular migrants	62.5	15	22.5	75	7.5	17.5
Irregular migrants deserve land for farming	65	12.5	22.5	70	22.5	7.5
Presence of irregular migrants will not attract more irregular migration	92.5	5	25	87	2.5	12.5
Irregular migrants will voluntarily repatriate.	85	2.5	12.5	85	5	7.5

functions. In 2007, Burundi ranked 131 out of 179 countries in the Transparency International corruption index, to make matters worse in 2010 it dropped to 170 out of 178 countries. In connection to the reasons stated above, another respondent was argued that they were financially incapable and that it was unwise to resort to criminal activities for the purposes of acquiring wealth or travel documents as shown in the following quote:

“We don’t fear the outcome, better be arrested, detained or expelled rather than stay in Burundi in rampant poverty; as human beings, our children need food, education, health care, clothing and other essentials of life but where shall we get them”? “It is extremely difficult to make ends meet, start business without capital, land is scarce and when available it is not productive. In addition, casual labour is scarce compared to Tanzania where even if you don’t get permanent or temporary employment, land is available, you can either be employed as a cheap labourer or be self-employed and life goes on” (a 39 years old

man from Kagera-Nkanda village).

The verbal testimony was in conformity to what USDS (2011) reported that children and young adults in Burundi have been coerced into forced labour in small farms or informal commercial activities. The report also claimed that some of the traffickers are the victim’s family members, neighbours or friends who under the pretext of assisting with education or employment opportunities lure them into forced labour.

Witchcraft was mentioned during the FGDs as one of the reasons which led to irregular migration of migrants from Burundi to Kasulu. Therefore, this scenario reflects the observation reported by AFP (Agency France-press) (2008) as cited by news24 Archives (2008) that, belief in witchcraft is widespread in some parts of Burundi and a number of people are killed each year under suspicion of participating in sorcery. The killings continue because the perpetrators are rarely properly punished. Other reasons for irregular migration as discussed by the FGDs participants

include intensification of security in Burundi where criminals flee Burundi and seek refuge in Kasulu.

Attitudes of smallholder farmers on irregular migrants

Responding to the second objective of this study, data was collected using a five point Likert scale which comprised 8 statements. However, for easy follow-up the five point scale was later reduced to a three point scale by grouping agree and strongly agree together and likewise disagree and strongly disagree, the results for this are presented in Table 4. Nonetheless, the results for the five point Likert scale are presented in Table 3. Generally results in Table 3 show that the attitude of smallholder farmers using and those employing IRMs against IRMs were mixed as indicated in Table 3. The respondents were asked to say whether they strongly disagreed, disagreed, undecided, agreed, or strongly agreed with each statement. The descriptive statistics was used to

Table 4. Three categories of overall attitude towards irregular migrants (n=80).

Attitude scale	Smallholder farmers employing irregular migrants (n _E = 40)		Smallholder farmers not employing irregular migrants (n _{NE} = 40)	
	Frequency	Percent	Frequency	Percent
Favourable attitude	12	30.0	4	10.0
Indifferent attitude	1	2.5	1	2.5
Unfavourable attitude	27	67.5	35	87.5

analyse the information on attitude of the respondents towards IRMs whereby scores on individual statements and overall scores on all the statements were used to determine the extent of their attitudes.

The field findings in Table 3 show that with the exception of the responses to the fourth statement having 42.5 and 45% of smallholder farmers employing and those who do not employ IRMs, in each statement disagreed with almost all the statements that sought to measure their attitude towards the presence of IRMs in their area. Thus, this finding confirms that although IRMs are living with and employed by smallholder farmers yet, both smallholder farmers have a negative attitude on their presence. The study findings are in line with Berry (2008) who stated that villagers were unhappy with IRMs as they come to steal their crops in farms.

The results on attitude towards IRMs as presented in Table 3 also show that 67.5 and 57% of smallholder farmers employing and those not employing IRMs disagreed with the statement that IRMs are not a burden to the national security. While 22.5 and 15% of the respondents in the same categories agreed with the same statement above. The findings also show that 55 and 55% of both smallholder farmer employers and non-employers of IRMs respectively disagreed with the statement that employing IRMs will strengthen the economy of Tanzania.

On the other hand, results in Table 3 show that 30 and 25% of the respondents in the same categories of smallholder farmers agreed with the statement that using IRMs will strengthen the economy of Tanzania. These results were not different from those obtained from the statement that IRMs have not created any enmity among local community members, 67.5 and 72.5% of the respondents in the two categories of smallholder farmers disagreed with, while 30 and 22.5% of the respondents in the two categories of smallholder farmers agreed with this statement that IRMs have not created any enmity among local community. The above seem to somehow agree with Rezouni (2010). According to Rezouni illegal/irregular migration can have both positive (benefits) and negative aspects (disadvantages) and that these may be both to the destination and sources countries. For example, while reducing the number of unemployed in the departure countries it may increase that rate in the host countries. Therefore, the study area's

economy being predominantly agricultural driven means competition for agricultural land between the IRMs and local may arise. However, on the other hand farmers with large farms can easily get cheap labour to work on the farms consequently denying locals possibilities of being employed as casual labourers. Other results are as shown in Table 3. A descriptive analysis was further applied to find the group which had favourable, indifferent and unfavourable attitudes. Since the statements were 8, if one had chosen favourable attitude for all the 8 statements, he would have scored 40, that is, 8×5 equals 40. Similarly, if one had been indifferent by choosing 3 out of 8 statements, one would have scored 24, that is, 8×3 equals 24. This means that the minimum possible score was 8, that is, 8×1 equals 8. Therefore, 8 to 23 points denoted unfavourable attitude; 24 denoted indifferent attitude, and 25 to 40 points denoted favourable attitude. Table 4 shows that the proportion of those who had favourable, indifferent and unfavourable attitude were 30, 2.5 and 67.5%, respectively for smallholder farmers employing IRMs and 10%, 2.5% and 87.5%, respectively for smallholder farmers not employing IRMs. The results are consistent with those in Table 3 which indicate that smallholder farmers generally are not comfortable with the presence of IRMs in their areas. This implies that regardless of whether they employ IRMs or not more than a half of the respondents (both smallholder farmers in the same categories) had more negative than positive attitude towards IRMs.

The results on attitude of the respondents reported during face to face interview with key informants were similar to those reported during the FGDs. Some of the issues reported include accusations of theft of crops and cattle, destruction of crops such as maize, beans and cassava, grazing livestock on their farms and destroying the environment due to logging activities, charcoal making and disruption of farming activities. Other problems often mentioned and which were caused by IRMs include banditry, car hijacking and deforestation. The findings above are consistent with those by Rutinwa (2003) who pointed out that, it was uncommon for locals to hire refugees to work on their farms, because the former accused the latter of theft of crop from farms of local smallholder farmers living along the border areas.

Observation from FGDs further showed that there was

no direct evidence of IRMs being more active in criminal activities than the rest of the population in Kasulu. However, both categories of smallholder farmers were somehow not happy with IRMs due to their misbehaviours, as it was mentioned by the respondents during FGDs that IRMs were involved in activities such as robbery, homicide and acquiring of land illegally. Furthermore, the study revealed that, smallholder farmers employing IRMs were reluctant to finger point and accuses IRMs over criminal activities because they still need them in their agricultural activities. The above seem to conform to Chappell et al. (2011) who have pointed out that Irregular migration does pose significant social and political challenges to the destination countries. In addition, Rezouni (2010) has pointed out that illegal/irregular migration can lead to organized crimes and flourishing of violent gangs thus posing some potential threat to security in destination countries.

During the interview the respondents also reported that IRMs sometimes demand things such as good feeding, clothing and extra payment for drinking local brew which smallholder farmers cannot afford. Expressing their attitude against IRMs, the respondents during the FGDs disclosed that sometimes IRMs were not attached to one smallholder farmer rather they would serve different farmers at different times in the same season, for example, a wife of an IRM enter into a contract with a different smallholder farmer apart from the one contracted by her husband. In order to attend to both jobs, they jointly rotate from one farm to another in the same season as a result creates misunderstandings among smallholder farmers. This observation seems to suggest that IRMs are paid meagre wages and that they have to look for extra work to augment their income. Reacting during FGDs, the respondents claimed that, although IRMs were coming to Kasulu aimed at getting employment as cheap labourers some of them were migrating to Tanzania with the entire families to seek for permanent residence illegally. In connection to these findings Koser (2005) argues that unless the economic rationale of irregular migrants is properly understood, efforts to manage them are unlikely to succeed.

Observation from the FGDs further show that IRMs were sometimes viewed as a burden to the government due to frequent operations carried out against them. They further argued that, the cost of both time and money spent in these operations could have been used in other sectors such as agriculture, education or health. They also claimed that sometimes IRMs have been deliberately registered as voters or applied for birth certificates either for themselves or for their children knowing that they were not Tanzanians.

It was also highlighted that IRMs grabbed land, bought or inherited it from fellow Burundians who have been living in Tanzania for many years. This generally suggests that the local people are being deprived of the right and opportunities for land ownership, thus causing

endless chaos and conflicts between Tanzanians and IRMs on land management and other natural resources. In line with these findings, Bastian and Don (2009) stated that, the forces that determine the scale of international migration is powerful. And that, growing disparities in the level of prosperity and human security are experienced by different societies and the ability to modify them is still limited. Findings from the study also show that forests, soil, and water are essential elements in supporting the livelihoods of many poor local smallholder farmers. However, the observed massive land clearing for agriculture related activities which is largely a result of deepening poverty and the provision of cheap labour in the form of IRMs has been blamed for accelerating deforestation. According to UNEP (2005) refugees and locals had to travel much greater distances to find firewood and wood for construction than was necessary 10 years ago, this is because some people have chosen to illegally cut down living trees, thus contributing to the degradation. These observations suggest that changing of the landscape is likely to occur leading to soil erosion and threatening agricultural production among smallholder farmers.

Based on the above, If no immediate measures are taken, then as it is argued, free immigration of IRMs in connection with culture of shifting cultivation done by both local smallholder farmers and IRMs in the areas with huge forest and bushes could weaken state regulation and the ability to control and plan over both agriculture activities and IRMs. A similar trend of constraints was observed by Veney (2007) who admits that, presence of the IRMs has positive and negative impacts on host communities; the negative impacts include environmental degradation, among other problems.

Expressing the hostility created along the border between Tanzania and Burundi, IRMs during the in-depth interview it was pointed out that after they get paid for their labour and while on their way back to their country they are frequently ambushed by robbers claimed to be Tanzanians who take all the money paid: This in return compels IRMs to avenge against Tanzanians who go to Burundi for business and other purposes by ambushing and robbing them. These study findings suggest that unless security is strengthened along the border of both countries, the good relations amongst the citizens of Burundi and Tanzania living along the border may be at risk of being strained.

Observations from the FGDs further show that, accountable and responsive governance on IRMs at local level is often weak; this has been attributed to both impaired social capital and limited financial capacity of the government at local community level. This is simply because the majority of the local smallholder farmers at village level regardless of whether they are leaders, whether they employ IRMs or not, young or old have at one point in time got into conflict with IRMs. The findings are consistent with the findings by Berry (2008) who

reported that there is a danger in assuming that the interaction between IRMs and smallholder farmers depends only on economic improvements, this can actually encourage competition on production and conflict that leads to isolation and segregation between smallholder farmers and IRMs.

The study findings are also consistent with those of a study by Duvel (2006) who reported that sometimes, irregular migration is a product of a government failure to meet the immigration needs of the country by providing adequate opportunities to travel and staying once IRMs have settled. In explaining their concerns over IRMs, some of the key informants, during the face to face interviews point out that, the presence of IRMs has led to a reduction of prices of agricultural produce and has lowered employment wages for local labourers:

“Employment opportunities for local people living along the border depends on people who come directly from Burundi, but, “because of involvement of irregular migrants in agricultural related activities here in Kasulu, labour costs have gone down as well as the prices for both farm and non-farms products. This is because, irregular migrants engage in both marketing of crops and cheap labour” (A 46 year old man, Mvugwe village).

According to Gordon (2007), irregular workers in the destination country tend to add and compete with the pool of unskilled labourers and are generally successful in finding employment by accepting lower wages unlike the native workers.

Problems irregular migrants face in their interaction with local community

Table 5 shows that, more than three quarters (77.5%), of the IRMs interviewed said that lack of work and residence permit have led them into serious problems related to immigration status, Less than three quarters (70%) of the IRMs stated that they have difficulty in doing self-reliance activities. In line with the stated problems, 65% of the respondents reported that they lacked freedom to be hired in the agricultural activities for similar reasons related to illegal stay in Kasulu. The results also reveal that three quarter (75%) of the IRMs reported that, lack of social services such as schools for children and healthcare services were among the problems prevalent in the studied area. About, 75% of the IRMs reported to not having formal contracts and were underpaid. Whereas alleged of theft and robbery constituted 22.5% of respondents. The remaining over a tenth (12.5%) of the IRMs said that they lack refugee identity cards thus leading to frequent arrests and detentions once they venture out of the camp.

During the FGDs, the participants reported to have been exploited, facing physical and emotional abuse, being poorly paid and some of them become victims of human trafficking where they get transferred to other

regions against their will to serve in agricultural activities as cheap labourers. According to McKay (2009), the majority IRMs are lowly paid and because of low wages are often associated with high levels of exploitation and criminals thus become an important part of millions of vulnerable workers employed in the informal sector and who are striving to seek their rights.

During the face to face interviews with key informants, some IRMs shed light on corrupt incidents that take place along non-official borders and within the village. They claimed that they were ordered by Militiamen who stay along the border to give them bribe with money ranging from 3000 to 5000 Tsh as entrance fees; whoever declines to pay is denied entry into the country. The respondents also reported to have been forced by village leaders to pay them between 10 000 to 30 000 Tsh as permit to stay in the village or as a land fee for cultivation. The above findings are similar to what has been reported by UNDP (2009). According to UNDP irregular migration can be influenced by geographical proximity, employment opportunities, and ease of entry into a country. However, irregular migrants can on the other hand find themselves at risk of suffering unemployment, insecurity and social marginalization: at times they are seen as the cause of these problems. During in-depth interview one of the respondents confessed to have been underpaid and overworked by smallholder farmers:

“Our payment is fixed and it ranges from 250,000 to 450000 Tsh in a season. Besides, we are given only two days a week to rest, during local common market days. But also we have no limit of land to farm as this is subject to the employer’s discretion, we can even till more than ten hectares for the same payment. Moreover, payment is done after the crops have been harvested and sold”. (An IRMs aged 34 years from Mvugwe village)

It was also reported by the FGDS participants that while waiting for their payment, IRMs were taken by their employers to perform other tasks regardless of whether or not they were paid for these activities. Generally, they were asked to render their services in return for the food they consume while waiting for payment. Discussants claimed that, they were reluctant to decline because they knew any kind of resistance could amount to having them arrested and deported for their illegal immigration status. This finding is similar to that of Duvell et al. (2008) that IRMs cannot normally form non-government organizations, such as trade unions, civic associations or become members of any parties, a situation which could enable them negotiate for better treatment in the provision of labour services. In connection to the above findings, during in-depth interview, one IRM said that:

“We, irregular migrants, are particularly vulnerable as a group because our irregular status prevents us from asking for social and legal assistance out of fear of being

Table 5. The factors affecting irregular migrants (n=40).

Statements	Frequency	Percent
Lack of freedom to be hired.	26	65.0
Deprived of self-reliance activities	28	70.0
Lack of social services	30	75.0
Alleged of theft and robbery	10	25.0
Lack of refugee identity cards	17	42.5
No formal contract and underpaid,	30	75.0
Lack of working and residence permit	31	77.5

identified, caught or prosecuted and thereafter imprisoned or deported. For this reason, we don't want to take action against our employers lest we find ourselves in jeopardy". "We sometimes spend a day in the farm without food and nowhere to seek for food as we are not living in the community, our temporary houses are scattered and far from each other, we have neither phones nor any other means of communication, no social services for ourselves and for our children such as school and official health related centre". (A woman aged 40 years of age, Kagera-Kanda village).

According to Birman (2005) IRMs are characterised by some more subtle ways of vulnerability, including illiteracy or suffering from economic or social disadvantages and because of these characteristics these people are exposed to greater risks than other groups by virtue of their membership to the oppressed, powerless, unemployed and traumatized groups.

Testimonies on various factors affecting irregular migrants

In order to get more details on the problems facing IRMs in Kasulu District, respondents were asked to give more information related to their flight history and the link between their problems and smallholder farmers. The sub section presents testimonies from few IRMs who gave their flight story. The responsible IRMs were coded in order not to compromise their confidentiality. Therefore, IRM were assigned to their corresponding numbers which implied irregular migrants from Burundi. For example, the first interviewee hereby referred to as IRM 1, the second IRM 2 and so on.

Box 1: IRM Testimony

"I can't remember how my parents fled from Burundi to the DRC. I was born and raised in the DRC; but my father told me that prior to their departure to the DRC, our house was attacked by grenades and they escaped and fled to the outskirts of the village. I fled DRC to Tanzania in 1997 following the outbreak of war caused by

escalating conflict between different armed opposition groups in DRC. I faced difficulties during my flight as I lost my parents and siblings. In 2006, I returned to Burundi and was given a small portion of land to live on. However, I spent only eight months in Burundi before I returned to Tanzania and integrated locally in one of the local villages where I have been working as a casual labourer."

"In Burundi, land is scarce; it is hard to find many people possessing more than two hectares in one block. People own several pieces of land which are scattered and most of them are not arable. It is hard to get a job or be self-employed. If I get a chance to be employed as a casual labourer in Burundi, payment is a problem, we are paid 5000 BIF per hectare without extra benefit while in Tanzania payment for a season ranges between 250,000 and 450,000 Tsh, depending on the nature of the contract, and some of cheap labourers are even paid money and food, some are given land in advance as form of payment. Equally, others may be given a one year contract which includes clearing the farm, cultivating, planting up to harvesting; others may commit themselves for some of the above activities and off they go".

According to IRM1, hardship of life, shortage of land, unemployment, lack of incentives in farming and underpayment were the main reasons for his migration to Tanzania. On why he didn't have a legal travel document, he said it was difficult to acquire such documents because of bureaucracy and corruption in Burundi; they are forced to pay 20,000 BIF for a two day permission to travel to Tanzania. According to Bastian and Don (2009), forces that determine the scale of international migrations are very strong and that growing disparities in terms of prosperity and human security is experienced by different societies and the ability to modify them is very limited.

Box 2: Testimony for IRMI continued

IRM1 continue to say, "My home was about 200 m, from the border and through the assistance of a Tanzanian friend. I was introduced to the security guards at the border who demanded payment of 5,000 Tsh. This

payment allows us to enter Tanzania does not guarantee neither a work permit nor resident permit and there is no receipt issued. There are several means by which fellow Burundians use to get into Tanzania. Some enter Tanzania through unguarded informal crossings during common market days pretending to be Tanzanian as they are fluent in both Kiswahili and The local vernacular language Ha. I left Burundi due to diverse reasons connected to socio-economic and political instability. When I hear on radio about the ongoing civil and political turbulence in my country, I recall the past and find myself unwilling to return to Burundi. I know my father was either killed due to his refusal to support one of the political parties or because of land related problems.”

“I am fully acknowledging that I live and work illegally in Tanzania but, there is no way out because I don't face any problems except when I am caught by immigration officers, the police or forest officers. Our employers and other villagers assure us of security for our property, housing, residence and payment for the duration of our stay in Tanzania. Apart from farming, I also participate in logging” (A 29 year IRM, Kagera-Nkanda Village).

However, IRM1 has faced some problems with his employer in Kasulu; these include underpayment contrary to what was agreed and lack of food while living in the farm areas. Nonetheless, IRM1 refrained from reporting them to the authorities and according to IRM1 this was due to that, irregular migrants have limited rights while in exile. IRM1 declined to report the case to the police because he knew taking the case to court would lead to risks such as arrest, detention and deportation for illegal entry and residence. The testimony by IRM1 for the reasons of his fleeing to Kasulu District is due to violation of human right as stipulated by UDHR (1948) which states that “All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood” (United Nations, Undated, 2016).

Box 3: IRM2 testimony

“I previously left Burundi in 1993, together with my neighbour after my parents were shot dead during the war. I managed to escape when our hideout in the forest was ambushed. During the incident, I was shot and that led to the amputation of my right leg which is still painful to date. Those who survived the killings brought me to Tanzania where I was hospitalized in one of the hospitals in the refugee camp. In 2005, I voluntarily got repatriated to Burundi but contrary to my wish I was kept in a newly established peace village for more than a year without being given a plot of land to build my house. Life became difficult and I decided to return to Tanzania. Since I was familiar with local villages in Tanzania I didn't go to the refugee camp rather I went to one of the villages and

engaged in farming as a cheap labourer. Generally, I came to Kasulu to look for employment as a cheap labourer as I couldn't find both employment and land to rebuild my life in Burundi. However, life is not simple while working as a cheap labourer in Kasulu. We are sometimes forced to live in grass thatched houses within the forest or near the farm land” (A 34 year old IRM, Nyachenda Village).

The testimony given above is consistent with the results by Bastian and Don (2009) who pointed out that, some people who become IRMs cannot return to their country of origin even if they want because of unsafe conditions, lack of documentation needed to travel, or refusal of their country of origin to accept them. They find themselves homeless, become stuck, and destitute, cannot resolve their irregular migration situation and hence reliant on support sometimes provided by local charities or churches (Koser, 2000).

Box 4: IRM3 testimony

Narrating his flight story and living conditions in Kasulu, IRM3 has this to say. “I left Burundi in 1993, following social and political unrest in Burundi. Although my village by then had not yet been ambushed by either government or rebel soldiers, villagers were nonetheless terrified by the gun shots from a neighbouring village. “My father forced me and the rest of the family to flee to Kitanga village in Tanzania where we have established our residence. This is one of the villages hosting many Burundian refugees who didn't reach the reception centre or Mtabila refugee camp.” “IRM3 continue to say, “all of my family were repatriated to Burundi in 2006 after the Tanzania Government conducted an operation for irregular migrants. Since 1993 when we arrived in Tanzania, I have neither had nor attempted to apply for any legal document from the government which could allow me live and work peacefully in Tanzania. Since then, I have been working as a casual labourer in a farm and sometimes have been spending little time working on my own farm, which I inherited from a fellow Burundian. I wish to live in Tanzania permanently but the problem I am facing is how to obtain a permit to live legally and peacefully. My life is in danger, as I risk being arrested by immigration and forest officers who prohibit people from entering and doing any business in the forest reserves. We sometimes spend the day hiding awaiting the departure of these officers. Since 1993, when I arrived in this village I have neither gone nor wished to return to Burundi or in the refugee camp.

“IRM 3 continued to say that, “I left Burundi when I was young. I have spent most of my time in Tanzania doing casual work as a cheap labourer with different smallholder farmers. I have closely integrated with the Tanzanian

culture, I speak Ha language fluently more than even my venacular language. I have a plot for my own crops and I am married to a Tanzanian woman sincerely I am not ready to go to Burundi. I would rather die here in Tanzania. How can I go and leave my family in Tanzania? (A 40 year old IRM, Mvugwe Village).

Box 5: IRM4 testimony

"I fled to the DRC from Burundi in 1993 together with my foster parents following generalised violence in Burundi. I don't know whether my parents were killed or not because since we fled separately I have never heard from them. We didn't stay long in DRC, as the war broke out due to political differences between Kabila and his opponents during which my foster parent was killed and left me with no one to save my life until when I met one of my Burundian neighbours who brought me with her to Tanzania. She advised me not to return to Burundi as those who killed my parents are still occupying our land and I risk being killed upon return to Burundi. I hear on radio that people are still being abducted and killed in Burundi."

Responding as to why he left Burundi he said. "Initially the problem was associated with both ethnicity between Hutu and Tutsi and witchcraft as they alleged my parents were witches. The problem intensified and later on our houses were invaded and burnt down. I saw the perpetrators with local weapons such as swords, spears and axes. I was seriously wounded, but at least I escaped the killing and fled to the DRC and then to Tanzania. It took me three weeks before I reached the refugee camp where I stayed for one year without being regularised as a refugee. Following social exclusion of refugees at the camp, I became integrated into one of the Tanzanian villages where I had been working as a cheap labourer since 2001. I married a fellow Burundian and we are blessed with four children. I have my own house and land acquired illegally. Because I left the camp with my ration card, I had in those years received and enjoyed all the rights as a refugee including receiving food and non-food items given in the camp. Explaining why he does not want to return to Burundi IRM4 had these to say, "Burundi is a small country and land is scarce compared to its population and is overused. And due to our problems I appeal to the concerned Tanzanian authorities to consider allowing us (IRMs) enter, travel and reside without legal documents, because what we are looking for is just little money to make ends meet together with our families. I have five hectares of land with different types of crops and three cheap labourers who are fellow irregular migrants" (A 38 year old IRM, Mvugwe Village).

In connection to the above testimony, UNHCR (2004) argues that the impacts of IRMs are both positive and

negative. However, the dynamics between positive and negative factors are complex and vary depending on several factors, including the political economy of hosting countries and the nature of host-IRMs relations. Even when IRMs situation creates economic opportunities for both the displaced and their hosts, there can be winners and losers.

Box 6: IRM5 testimony

"I can't exactly remember my flight to Tanzania but I recall arriving in 2000. Before I fled to Tanzania I was once caught, beaten by rebels because I refused to join them in the battle field, that is, against the Burundi government. I was held captive for nine months, during which I was sodomised and brutally tortured. I survived through God's mercy. Although I have lived in Tanzania for several years since then I have neither claimed for my refugee status nor has my individual refugee status been determined by any authority. I didn't present myself for refugee status identification for fear of being under restriction of movement in and out of the camp. Hence, I decided to live in the local village engaging in agricultural activities and I have never returned to Burundi due to land problems and difficulties of life.

"My biggest challenge is where I shall be tomorrow in case the government of Tanzania decides to expel me from where I live. Being an IRM is equivalent to being a sub human;" "I am concerned over my illegal and temporary residence status in Tanzania as well as returning to Burundi" "Home is where I have slept today while waiting for my death". My land in Burundi is already occupied by those who remained behind and I don't know where to lodge my claim. Indeed irregular migration stops us from investing anything on a long term business, I can't engage in business or construct a permanent house, get better and quality education for myself and our children, legally own a large farm and similar projects. I live in a state of limbo and I often depend on others to find solutions for my plight." "Social services are another challenge facing us (IRMs): there are rough and impassable roads towards the areas occupied by IRMs. There is neither hospital nor a health centre, no school for the children as schools are situated about 20 km away from the main village. IRMs who seek to attend primary and post primary education in Tanzania are subjected to the same formalities as other foreign students including the need to apply and pay for a study permit otherwise remain vulnerable for arrest and deportation. Such resident permits are expensive and hard to obtain. In fact, I am not ready to go to Burundi due to the experiences I went through. I heard that antagonism between Hutu and Tutsi still exists in Burundi. I own nothing and I was told that our own land has been allocated by the government to someone else who has a title deed" (A 30 year old IRM, Kitanga Village).

Based on the testimonies given by the IRMs, one can sense that uncertain nature of the IRMs livelihoods both in host and country of origin regardless whether they are living in remote area; have access to employment opportunities, property rights and restrictive laws (Mark, 2009). Often compel IRMs to look for alternative options as cheap labourers outside their country of origin. As a result a new type of social movement is formed which creates a new social contact and conflict in the host country. In connection to that, observation form testimonies do not suggest the possibility of reducing the magnitude of IRMs and it is important to be realistic about prospects of IRMs in Tanzania. Obviously, irregular migration by Burundians will continue for the foreseeable future as explained by Bojadžijev (2005) that while mobility in the form of labour migration is seen as a source of exploitation to the country of exile; on the other hand, it is seen as a panacea to relations of exploitation and dominance from the country of origin. Further to the findings above, Bastian and Don (2009) points out that some IRMs may willingly stay without legal documents, because they fear conflict in their country of origin and they neither conform to any stereotypes nor their individual circumstances affect what they do and it is usually very difficult for them to resolve their status and be re-issued with the permit they need.

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

A number of conclusions are hereby drawn from the above major findings. First, there is a growing recognition of the long-term and short term existence of IRMs in Kasulu District and it is better to accept that the state has, nevertheless, failed to control irregular migration effectively and efficiently. The existence of IRMs in Kasulu is to a great extent connected to economical, social-cultural and political turmoil in their country of origin. Secondly, it is concluded that, despite criminal acts done by IRMs. The majority smallholder farmers are reluctant over IRMs, This basically justify that, there is inadequacy information sharing about IRM workers and their aftermath to local community. The general inability to effectively manage IRMs, lack of strong internal control and improper data collection to both employed and unemployed IRMs is a cause of alarm. Lastly, it is concluded that, there are many factors affecting both smallholder farmers and IRMs and this is due to lack of effective and consistent approaches from the national to local levels that address the concerns of both IRMs and the smallholder farmers. The challenges facing both smallholder farmers and IRMs are expected to last longer, if immediate solutions will not be taken timely.

Based on the study's conclusions, the following are recommended. First, it is recommended that, the immigration department and other security organs working along the border should establish several entry posts either permanent or mobile one along the country

borders to deter IRMs and ease visa issuance process for those migrants wishing to enter the country legally. It is also recommended to village authorities to have special register books for all legal and irregular migrants residing in their area. These registers could help smallholder farmers establish facts of whether a particular migrant has the right to employment or not, hence helping smallholder farmers abide by the country's immigration laws and regulations. Lastly, the study further recommends that, the government at all level should provide intensive training to local community members with special emphasis on migration laws, security and land management. Awareness building that leads to segregation for future potential migrants should be highlighted and addressed.

CONFLICT OF INTERESTS

The authors have not declared any conflict of interests.

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